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Renewable resource management is necessary to avoid the dissipation of 
inter-temporal rents due to open access exploitation. In reality management is 
costly, which implies that the first best solution is not appropriate. Management 
costs must be considered explicitly in optimization problems, to find the 
appropriate second best solutions. This is the focus of this dissertation, which 
contains applied theoretical analyses of dynamic bio-economic models, where 
moving away from open access exploitation of a renewable resource is costly. 
Partial equilibrium problems of harvesting a scarce renewable resource 
are analyzed, where economic incentives of poachers, who are punished if 
caught, are included. Harvest, enforcement and resource price are endogenously 
determined. The punishment increases poachers' expected marginal costs and the 
resource market price, which forces at least some poachers out of the market. 
 
Different relative harvest cost structures are considered between social planner 
and poachers, which drives the manner in which the market supply is optimally 
shared between them. Corrective policies are given for a pseudo-monopolist 
seeking to maximize his discounted profit instead of total economic surplus. 
Further policy adjustments are characterized, in case the resource entails non-
market values. 
A two-good, two-variable-factor bio-economic trade model is also 
developed for a small country. Open access, first and second best resource 
management models are analyzed, assuming that instantaneous gains are 
independent of the resource stock and that resource management incurs a flow of 
instantaneous fixed cost. The most empirically realistic model allows for 
resource management regime switches, which is influenced by the trade regime 
and the world price of the resource good. 
Different cases are characterized in relation to changes in welfare and 
conservation, following a move from autarky to free trade. Free trade is 
unambiguously beneficial in some cases, but not always. Specifically, if open 
access is the second best management regime in autarky, then a small 
comparative advantage in the resource good could be detrimental to the home 
country. There exists a greater comparative advantage in the resource good, 
above which free trade would be beneficial. Understanding what drives the 
empirically relevant detrimental consequences of free trade can be helpful for 
policy-making. The second best trade model developed in this dissertation 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, economists have known that renewable resources tend to be 
exploited in open access, which leads to economic overexploitation. This can be 
avoided if a clear property right exists for the resource (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; 
Coase, 1960; Hardin, 1968; Smith, 1968; Clark, 1990), or if a policy is put in place that 
makes resource harvesters behave as if they had a property right to the resource (Clark, 
1990). Economic overexploitation results because individuals, who do not own the 
resource, harvest until their net marginal benefit is zero, as in a static optimization 
problem. However, the unexploited stock of renewable resource could be considered as 
an investment capital for society because some of it can be saved for future 
consumption, because the size of the resource stock can affect the instantaneous net 
benefits derived from it, and also because it regenerates through biological growth and 
thus provides dividends. Therefore, a benevolent social planner would maximize the 
discounted social welfare generated by the exploited resource, i.e., he would consider 
the problem as a dynamic one. The social planner's problem leads to the optimal 
exploitation path, where for economically scarce resources, at any point in time, 
exploitation should occur at a level where net marginal benefit is greater than zero. The 
amount of marginal net benefit on the last unit harvested is called the resource rent, i.e., 
the discounted marginal return on investment in the resource for the future. 
A “clear property right” can be understood as defined in western civilization: 
legally binding, enforceable and owned for example by an individual, a company or an 
association. There also exist renewable resources held as common-property, i.e., whose 




self-enforced, and is typically owned by a group of individuals in a specific geographic 
area, as is sometimes found in less developed economies (Ostrom, 1990). In the absence 
of clear property rights, western style or common-property, policies that create 
incentives for harvesters to behave optimally are taxes and harvest quotas, possibly 
tradable quotas, which mimic actual property rights to the resource (e.g., Clark (1990), 
chapter 8). 
The main motivation for this dissertation is that, even though the property right 
problem and policy prescriptions are clear, open access exploitation is still observed 
empirically. Renewable resources are rarely managed as prescribed, and property rights 
are typically not perfectly enforced. At times, despite renewable resource management 
policies, resources are exploited illegally, at least in part, by others than the designated 
harvesters. Specifically, despite existing policies, black markets in renewable resources 
are observed worldwide, these resources often being endangered species. What then 
could explain the discrepancy between policy prescriptions what we observe? 
The simplest dynamic models leading to the tax and quota prescriptions 
generally suppose only one economic distortion, or departure from optimality: the lack 
of property right on a renewable resource. In reality however, there can be several 
distortions. In this dissertation, the costs of resource management are explicitly 
considered. These can also be called transactions costs, policy costs, agency costs or 
enforcement costs, depending on the details of the analysis. Indeed, it is perfectly 
intuitive that resource management policies are not free, that they are costly to the 
social planner or resource manager, be it a government or a private resource owner, and 




Another motivation for this dissertation is the growing interest in the impact of 
free trade of natural resources. Hence, costly resource management is considered not 
only in partial equilibrium, but also in trade analyses, where welfare and resource 
conservation are analyzed, moving from autarky to free trade. 
Accordingly, in the context of a renewable resource that is costly to manage, the 
objectives of this dissertation are to: 
i. characterize the optimal policy for the management of a scarce 
renewable resource; 
ii. explain how it may be optimal to observe legal and illegal harvests 
separately or simultaneously; 
iii. provide policy prescriptions for a scarce renewable resource that is 
owned by a sole owner who wishes to act as a monopolist; 
iv. provide policy prescriptions for a scarce renewable resource that not 
only has market value, but also stock value, i.e., its existence is 
valuable; 
v. characterize how resource management costs affect the conservation of 
the resource; 
vi. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under open access exploitation of the 
resource; 
vii. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under costless management of the 




viii. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under costly management of the resource, 
i.e., under a second best policy; 
ix. characterize the cases where the resource management regime could 
change due to free trade following autarky (open access versus costly 
management); and finally, 
x. characterize the cases where the move from autarky to free trade can be 
welfare decreasing, and by extension, where some level of barrier to 
trade would be better; and finally, 
xi. characterize the cases where the move from autarky to free trade can 
cause the extinction of the renewable resource. 
Objectives i. to v. are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, where management cost is 
assumed to be either an enforcement cost on the resource property right or an 
instantaneous fixed cost of taxation. The rest of the objectives are addressed in Chapter 
5, where the management cost is assumed to be an instantaneous fixed cost, necessary 
for the collection and re-distribution of a tax on harvest. Applied theoretical bio-
economic models are used to reach those eleven objectives. Dynamic problems in 
continuous time are solved, making use of the Maximum Principle developed in optimal 
control theory.  
Chapter 2 is a review of literature related to the issues analyzed in the rest of the 
dissertation. Chapter 3 is a partial equilibrium model where the optimal harvest of a 
scarce renewable resource is analyzed, the scarcity implying some level of market 




caught, are explicit and endogenous to the bio-economic model. The punishment 
increases poachers' expected marginal costs and the resource market price, which forces 
at least some of them out of the market. Harvest, enforcement and resource price are all 
endogenously determined. We find that different relative harvest cost structures 
between social planner and poachers are what drives the manner in which the market 
supply is optimally shared across legal and illegal harvesters. Indeed, the optimal 
resource supply can be legal only, illegal only, or both, and this composition can change 
over time. We also find that corrective policies are necessary in order to influence a 
pseudo-monopolist who seeks to maximize his own profit instead of total economic 
surplus. In fact, as long as he keeps the fines collected from poachers, the pseudo-
monopolist' harvesting behavior is second best optimal, but his property right 
enforcement level is not. We characterize alternative policies that make the pseudo-
monopolist's enforcement efforts second best optimal. Further corrective policies are 
also necessary in case the resource has value over and above its market value, and we 
solve for them under two different valuation assumptions. 
Chapter 4 is a natural extension of Chapter 3: for a slightly different partial 
equilibrium model, we provide phase diagram analyses with varying levels of resource 
management costs. In order to analyze the phase diagrams for the general model where 
instantaneous net gains are stock-dependent, the model needs to be simplified. The 
same simplification as in Cropper et al. (1979) is made for the harvest cost function, in 
order to compare our results with costly resource management (second best world) to 
theirs, which is based on the assumption of costless resource management (first best 




include open access, which leads to the realization that, whatever the discount rate, the 
costlier is resource management, the more likely is the extinction of the resource, 
especially if the initial stock is small. 
Chapter 5 is also a natural extension of Chapter 3. We use the simpler model 
where instantaneous gains from the renewable resource are not stock-dependent, but 
this time international trade is explicitly considered. A two-good, three-factor (two 
variable, one fixed) trade model is amended in order to include a dynamic bio-economic 
model with a fixed instantaneous resource management cost. First, assuming a pristine 
resource, the general equilibrium autarkic dynamics is characterized up to the feasible 
autarkic steady states. Then, assuming that the resource stock has reached a positive 
steady state stock in autarky, we consider free trade. Discounted and steady state 
welfare changes are characterized for the home country, assuming a trade regime 
change from autarky to free trade. Attention is also given to whether or not free trade 
could cause the extinction of the renewable resource. We find that conservation and 
welfare change due to free trade are related. 
 This is done for a home country that takes world prices as given, under different 
resource management regimes: (i) under open access exploitation; (ii) with costless 
resource management; (iii) with costly resource management; and finally, (iv) 
considering possible resource management regime switches between open access and 
costly management. With the empirically realistic possibility of resource management 
regime switches, different cases are characterized. In some cases, moving from autarky 
to free trade is welfare increasing and it helps the conservation of the resource. In other 




losses because proper second best management could be open access. It could also 
cause the extinction of the resource. Delineating the different cases in relation to 
welfare and conservation can be helpful for policy-making, which is what motivates 
Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 is the overall conclusion of the dissertation. Important results are 
summarized and potential further research endeavours are discussed. 
Throughout the dissertation, a number, n, in subscript refers to the derivative of 
a function with respect to its nth argument, while a prime in superscript, " ' ", refers to 
the derivative of a function with respect to its unique argument. A starred variable refers 
to its short-run equilibrium value, a starred variable with the subscript "∞ " refers to its 





CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In economics, well-defined property rights are often prescribed as a cure against 
the over-exploitation of renewable resources. Property rights theoretically provide 
proper incentives to work out the socially optimal solution, at least when there are no 
transactions costs (Coase, 1960). Under nonzero transactions costs however, “Property 
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gain of internalization becomes 
larger than the cost of internalization” (Demsetz, 1967, p.350). This means that, while 
property rights may exist on paper, their effectiveness does depend on the costs 
associated with them. The cost of internalization may include the administrative costs of 
policy-making or agency costs for the government. They may also include the cost of 
property right enforcement, since individual agents often have incentives not to follow 
the optimal policy and costly efforts are necessary to prevent them from cheating. 
Therefore, while an unmanaged natural resource will lead to open access exploitation 
and economic over-harvesting (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Hardin, 1968), the textbook 
optimal policy is in reality not optimal because it ignores the costs of the policy; the 
world is second best and the decision process must take that into account. 
Smith (1968) wrote one of the first dynamic models of resource management 
using the Maximum Principle, although his model did not allow for discounting; 
instead, he maximized steady state utility. Clark's book (1990) has become a classic 
reference on bio-economic modeling that summarizes issues of open access exploitation 
and dynamic optimization with discounting. Not surprisingly, it has been shown that 
open access, i.e., economic over-exploitation, of a renewable resource can lead to 




dynamic optimization does not preclude the optimal extinction of a renewable resource, 
even when its growth is purely compensatory, i.e., concave in stock. This has been 
shown, namely, by Clark (1973) in a discrete time maximization of present value profit 
from competitive exploitation of a renewable resource where the optimal path is a most 
rapid approach path (MRAP). Clark (1973) shows that if the marginal natural growth of 
the resource close to extinction is small as compared to the discount rate, then 
extinction could result, even though the exploitation regime is not open access. Cropper 
et al. (1979) do a similar analysis, only in a continuous time model, for which the 
optimal path is smooth and with endogenous price, since they analyze the social 
planner's problem. They get a result similar to Clark (1973). Specifically, extinction can 
be optimal if the discount rate is greater than the marginal natural growth rate of the 
resource close to zero. In Cropper et al. (1979) however, since several steady states are 
possible, whether extinction occurs or not also depends on the initial resource stock. 
While an unmanaged resource will lead to open access exploitation and 
economic over-harvesting (Gordon, 1954), naïve management of a renewable resource, 
i.e., management that ignores potential or actual illegal actions, may trigger perverse 
incentives. Specifically, resource management is likely to attract poachers attempting to 
capture the positive rent remaining from the resource stock at any point in time. Hence, 
costly enforcement efforts are required in order to avoid reverting to open access 
exploitation due to poaching, and these efforts ought to be considered endogenous to the 





Becker (1968) first analyzed rational illegal behavior using micro-economic 
theory, and the models of Chapter 3 combine the same approach with a bio-economic 
model to address the problem of an illegally harvested renewable resource or species. A 
number of earlier papers have looked at the costly enforcement of property rights in 
fisheries and wildlife markets. Sutinen and Andersen (1985) used the Becker approach 
to crime and punishment with costly enforcement as a control variable, but taking the 
legal harvest level as given. In another fisheries model, Milliman (1986) went one 
logical step further, as he made legal harvest an endogenous variable simultaneously 
with costly enforcement. Anderson and Lee (1986) added the proposition that the policy 
instrument itself ought to be endogenous since with costly resource management, 
economic policy instruments are not necessarily superior to other instruments. Skonhoft 
and Solstad (1996) used the same underlying ideas as Milliman (1986), but in a context 
of wildlife management in East Africa where poachers are local people hunting for 
subsistence. In contrast, in a fisheries model, Crabbé and Long (1993) used legal 
harvest only as a control variable in a Stackelberg model where the home-nation is the 
leader. In these papers, price is exogenous while legal harvest and enforcement efforts 
are used to avoid open access exploitation, so that the resource stock will be exploited at 
a lower rate and scarcity rents will not be entirely depleted at every point in time.1 
                                                 
1 Brown and Layton (1997) and Kremer and Morcom (2000) offer storage as a control 
variable for storable traded resource goods, with speculators storing more of the 




The models from Chapter 3 and 4 are more general than previous ones since the 
price of the resource, the legal harvest level and the property right enforcement level are 
all endogenous. Also, different relative harvest cost structures across legal and illegal 
harvesters are allowed. Under these more general assumptions, the models in these 
chapters encompass several previous models. 
The proposed models are also linked to the entry deterrence literature of 
industrial organization in the sense that the decision-maker modifies his behavior to 
deter entry into the market, here entirely or partially. Enforcement efforts and legal 
harvest levels are decided upon, given poachers' incentives. As in the papers mentioned 
above, successful policies will steer harvesters away from open access exploitation, thus 
leaving a higher stock than under open access exploitation (although not strictly). 
Renewable resources are often traded internationally. Freer trade often leads to a 
greater demand for the harvested resource. If the resource is well managed and the 
enforcement of property rights is costless, then we would expect freer trade to increase 
welfare of the home country. However, when property rights are costly to enforce, then 
the outcome of freer trade is not so clear. Considering that resource management is 
costly, in some instances open access may be chosen instead. In such cases, free trade 
may not be welfare-increasing. International trade and management costs are considered 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
                                                                                                                                               
4 abstract from speculative attempts and thus better apply to non-storable goods such as 




International trade in a world of second best has been studied by several authors. 
Well-known contributors to this literature are Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), who 
wrote about different possible types of distortions in an economy, and the policies that 
would lead to the first best outcome. They have shown that under such policies, free 
trade is necessarily welfare increasing, but without them, it may not be. Using their 
classification, the distortion we consider in this dissertation is an endogenous distortion, 
caused by a market imperfection under a laissez-faire policy. The first best policy for 
such a distortion is a tax-cum-subsidy on domestic production. Typically, resource 
management policy entails a tax-cum-subsidy scheme, a system of tradable quotas or a 
true change in property rights. The first best solution in our trade model with a 
renewable resource is therefore very similar to what these authors suggest – some 
resource management policy is applied directly to domestic production, in the sector 
where the distortion appears. Their work was later extended to include a ranking of 
different policies, in case the first best policy is, for some reason, unfeasible (Bhagwati, 
Ramaswami and Srinivasan, 1969). This is relevant to this dissertation since the 
management costs considered can render the usual policy (i.e., resource management) 
too expensive to be worth undertaking. In such a case, Bhagwati, Ramaswami and 
Srinivasan (1969) find that free trade may not be welfare increasing. Candidate second-
best policies are trade tariffs and a production factor tax-cum-subsidy. Which is the 
second best and the third best policy is case-dependent; they cannot be ranked 
analytically, as one would expect. In an oft-cited article, Bhagwati (1971) summarized 
and generalized the theory of distortions and welfare with international trade. The 




international trade, but our model is more complex. Indeed, Bhagwati and Ramaswami 
(1963) and Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) only considered static 
distortions, while the distortion that typically appears in renewable resource markets is a 
dynamic one. 
A number of contributions, which include dynamic considerations, were made to 
the international trade literature. First, at a time where some believed that free trade was 
not inter-temporally Pareto-optimal, Samuelson (1978) offered a two-page verbal 
argument to the contrary. He insisted that the entire transitory path be considered for 
comparative welfare analysis, rather than just the steady states, as some authors had 
done before, especially in the immiserizing growth literature. Then, Smith (1979) wrote 
a model that confirmed Samuelson's assertions. Samuelson (1978) and Smith (1979) 
only considered first best economies however. Distortions with international trade in a 
dynamic setting were later considered by Bark (1987) in a growth model for a small 
open economy. In Bark's paper, a government tax on capital initially exists for lump-
sum redistribution in the home country. Bark considers a tax increase at some point in 
time, which implies a greater distortion in the economy. Without any constraint on 
capital mobility, a new steady state is attained instantly. With some constraints on 
capital mobility, another steady state is attained in the long-run, where consumption, 
and therefore welfare, is lower than under the free trade instantaneous adjustment. 
However, when considering discounted inter-temporal welfare loss, Bark shows that the 
loss is always smaller with constraints on capital mobility than without. This is 
therefore an illustration of Samuelson's (1978) argument, but with a tax distortion in the 




findings, which include dynamic considerations, to Bhagwati's (1971) now classic 
summary of distortions and static welfare with international trade. 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation is a contribution to the literature on distortions and 
welfare, only the distortion considered here is a dynamic one. We analyze welfare 
changes between autarkic and free trade steady states, and also between trajectories 
from the time the home country opens to free trade. Our goal is to delineate, in the 
second best world where resource management is costly, the cases where trade 
restrictions might lead to greater welfare than free trade. 
To address environmental issues with international trade, recent efforts have 
concentrated on general equilibrium models, some with resource dynamics. Recent 
papers include Brander and Taylor (1997a, 1997b, 1998) on renewable resources, 
Chichilnisky (1993, 1994, 1996) on renewable resources and on the environment, 
Copeland and Taylor (1994) on the environment, Emami and Johnston (2000) on 
renewable resources and Hannesson (2000) on renewable resources as well. Most of 
these papers that dealt with a renewable resource analyzed either the open access 
management regime (infinite discount rate: the future does not matter) or the 
maximization of steady state utility (zero discount rate: the future is as important as the 
present). However, dynamic optimization normally makes use of a discount rate, δ , 
such that 0 < δ  < ∞ , which is assumed in Chapter 5. Also, in some recent renewable 
resource models of trade, specific functional forms prevented extinction from occurring 
with free trade but not in autarky, which seems counterintuitive (e.g., Brander and 
Taylor, 1997a). In contrast, in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, functional forms are as 




Also, all trade papers with environmental concerns mentioned thus far assume that the 
resource management regime is exogenous and constant over trade regimes. These 
papers provide interesting results, but we wish to go one step further and make the 
resource management regime endogenous. 
One previous trade paper does just that (Hotte et al., 2000). Our model in 
Chapter 5 is close in spirit to that of Hotte et al. (2000), except our renewable resource 
is managed by a benevolent resource planner, rather than being exploited by agents who 
maximize their profit and choose to enforce their own property rights accordingly. 
Hotte et al. (2000) found that freer trade may not be welfare-increasing, which is not 
surprising, given that in general equilibrium, private agents' decisions about property 
right enforcement are generally sub-optimal. This result goes back to de Meza and 
Gould (1992), who showed that in a perfectly competitive economy, private property 
right enforcement efforts, which use resources from the economy, may be smaller or 
greater than is socially optimal. Long (1994) showed the same regarding the timing of 
land enclosure. 
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the social planner's objective is to maximize the 
inter-temporal total economic surplus, while taking management cost into account. He 
takes the whole economy into account rather than only maximizing his own profit, as 
was done in Hotte et al. (2000) and de Meza and Gould (1992). In Chapter 5, departures 
from the usual result that freer trade is welfare-increasing therefore do not depend on 




CHAPTER 3. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH COSTLY 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
The illegal trade in wildlife, worth about five billion dollars annually, is the 
second most important cause of species extinction, the first cause being land use 
conversion that leads to the loss of natural habitat (Anderson, 1997; Le Duc, 1990). 
Since 1989, the US has been the most active player in illegal wildlife trade with 
estimated annual imports of $773 million and exports of $256 million (Anderson, 
1997). Paradoxically, there is also high demand for conservation in the US and this 
country plays a significant role in international enforcement efforts. The black market in 
endangered species has attracted substantial public attention as newspapers and 
magazines have featured articles on the problem, making it an issue known by most 
North Americans nowadays (Anonymous, 1996; Broussard, 1997; Brower, 1994; Glenn 
and Fino, 1998; Lavigne, 1998; Marston, 1997; Sabourin, 1998; Webster, 1997; to 
name only a few). Currently, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulates the trade of 33 659 species, 113 
sub-species and 46 wildlife populations worldwide 2,3. 
The main objective of this chapter is to propose a model especially suited to the 
case of endangered, hence scarce, harvested species. Another objective is to offer some 
                                                 
2 CITES Secretariat: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/species.shtml (July 28, 2004). 




policy insight for a resource that is legally managed and where poaching is a fact or at 
least a threat. 
In this chapter, we assume that the resource price is endogenous. In the social 
planner’s problem, where we assume he maximizes the discounted flow of total-
economic-surplus, price is endogenous to his actions. The social planner’s potential 
actions are his own legal harvest and his resource management enforcement efforts. His 
behavior leads to the welfare benchmark. 
In contrast, a private owner of the resource would maximize his discounted flow 
of profit. If the resource is scarce, due to its endangerment for example, then the private 
owner could have market power, and in such a case, price is endogenous in his problem 
as well. Indeed, a scarce resource is likely to be managed by a limited number of 
managers. For simplicity, the limiting case of a monopolist or a unique cartel of 
resource managers is compared to the social planner's model. In the case where the 
resource is not endangered, then an endogenous price could be observed because the 
resource is found in a limited geographic area, so it is owned by only one resource 
manager. Given that the profit-maximizing monopolist faces potential or actual 
poachers, he will be called pseudo-monopolist from now on. The pseudo-monopolist’s 
potential actions are also his own legal harvest and his property rights enforcement 
efforts. 
In this chapter, the legal harvest is provided either by the social planner or by 
the pseudo-monopolist, depending on the problem considered, and the illegal harvest is 




Throughout Chapters 3, 4 and 5, s(t) is the resource stock at time t, and its 
growth function, ( )( )g s t 0≥ , is assumed to be compensatory. That is, ( ) ( )g 0 g s 0= = , 
g'(0) > 0 and g''(s(t)) < 0 for all s such that ( )0 s t s≤ ≤ , where s  is the wildlife 
population's natural carrying capacity.  
In Chapter 3, we analyze the social planner's problem as the welfare benchmark. 
In section 3.2 we present the poachers' problem, whose solution then constrains the 
social planner's and the pseudo-monopolist's problems. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, the 
social planner's problem and the pseudo-monopolist's problems are analyzed, and 
corrective policies are suggested in order to make their solution coincide. Finally, we 
conclude this chapter in section 3.5. 
 
3.2. Poachers' problem 
Individual poachers do not own the renewable resource, and there are no barriers 
to their entry. Consequently, they are assumed to harvest under an open access regime. 
This means that they maximize their static profit and that there is entry of poachers until 
all rents are dissipated, i.e., profit is equal to zero for all poachers. They are also 
assumed to be risk-neutral, so they maximize their expected static profit. 
There is a probability, λ(t), that any poacher will get caught by an enforcer, 
which would lead to the poacher having to pay a per-unit harvest fine, φ. At any point in 
time, t, a poacher takes the resource market price, P(t), and the expected per-unit harvest 
fine, (t)λ φ , as given. An individual poacher's harvest cost is represented by a C2 




illegally harvests.4 Assume ( ) ( )1 IK ( t ,s t ) 0q > , ( ) ( )11 IK ( t ,s t ) 0q > , 
( ) ( )2 IK ( t ,s t ) 0q ≤ , ( ) ( )22 IK ( t ,s t ) 0q ≥ , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )211 22 12I I I( t ,s t ) ( t ,s t ) ( t ,s t ) 0q q qK K K⎡ ⎤− ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . The fixed cost of poaching 
is ( )( )F s t 0> . The fixed cost may depend on the resource stock, for example if it 
includes search costs for the stock. Consequently, we assume that ( )( )F' s t 0≤  and 
( )( )F'' s t 0≥ . Assuming poachers are identical and risk-neutral, and following Becker's 
approach to crime and punishment with null opportunity cost to the illegal activity, the 
poacher's problem is to maximize his expected profit, ( )( )E tπ : 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )




Max E t t P t t 1 t P t t K t ,s t F s tq q q
P t t t t K t ,s t F s tq q q
π = λ −φ + −λ − −
= −λ φ − −
 
Assuming a positive illegal harvest, the individual's first order condition is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 IP t t K t ,s t 0q−λ φ− = . (3.1) 
The open access regime will lead to entry until all expected rents are dissipated, so that, 
in market equilibrium, we obtain for each poacher: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )I I IE t P t t t t K t ,s t F s t 0q q qπ = −λ φ − − = . (3.2) 
Equating (3.1) to (3.2) leads to the conclusion that in open access, the marginal 
cost is equated to the minimum average cost for each identical poacher: 
 ( ) ( )( )





K t ,s t F s tq
q t ,s tK
tq
+
= . (3.3) 
                                                 




By the implicit function theorem, let ( )( )*Iq s t  be the value of qI that solves equation 
(3.3). We can simplify the notation for the problems to come in the rest of the chapter, 
and define the poachers' minimum average cost as: 
 ( )( )










= . (3.4) 
We find that ( )( ) ( )( )
2
I
K F'k ' s t 0
s tq
+
= < ,5 the stock effect on the minimum average cost is 
negative. 
Notice that in the special case where instantaneous gains are not stock-
dependent, i.e., ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0= , then the poachers' minimum average cost is constant 










= . (3.5) 
In the general case, combining (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4), one can infer the market 
equilibrium price, constrained by poachers' behavior, to be  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )P t k s t t= + λ φ . (3.6) 
Given the downward-sloping inverse demand curve ( )( )P Q t , the instantaneous market 
equilibrium total harvest is 
                                                 
5 Using (3.3), we find 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Q t D k s t t= + λ φ , (3.7) 
where ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1D k s t t P k s t t−+ λ φ = + λ φ . 
If the resource is exploited in open access only, without any probability of 
paying a fine, then the number of harvesters, ( )( )OA s tN , is ( )( )








In the special case where instantaneous gains do not depend on the resource stock, then 






3.2.1. Equilibrium paths 
As long as there is no enforcement, ( )t 0λ φ =  and open access results. In the 
special case where instantaneous gains do not depend directly on the resource stock, 
i.e., ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0= , the open access instantaneous equilibrium harvest is 
( )OAQ D k= . This indicates that the harvest level is invariant as the resource stock 
changes, Q(t) is thus constant and so ( ) ( )dQ t Q t 0
dt
= =& . The stock evolves according to 
the transition equation ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ds t s t g s t D k
dt
= = −& . The three possible equilibrium 
paths for this special case are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
In the more general case where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0> , the equilibrium harvest in 
open access depends on the resource stock: ( )( ) ( )( )( )OAQ s t D k s t= . As s(t) increases 





( ) ( ) ( )
OAdQ s t
D ' k ' 0
ds t
= ⋅ ⋅ > . In this case, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Q t D ' k ' s t= ⋅ ⋅& & , and 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )s t g s t D k s t= −& . Sample equilibrium paths for this case are illustrated in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1. Equilibrium paths and steady states in open access; ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0=  
       Q 
( )OAc cQ D k=                c 
( )OAb bQ D k=                b 
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Figure 3.2. Equilibrium paths and steady states in open access; ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0>  
       Q 
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3.2.2. Steady state equilibria 
In the special case where instantaneous gains do not depend directly on the 
resource stock, i.e., where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0= , a positive steady state occurs where 
OAs Q 0= =&& , in other words where ( ) ( )g s D k= . 
 
Definition 3.1. 
Let sMSY be the resource stock at which the harvest is at its maximum 
sustainable yield, i.e., the resource stock at which the growth function, ( )( )g s t , is at its 
maximum, which also corresponds to the resource stock at which steady state harvest is 





If ( ) ( )MSYg s D k> , then there are two potential steady states, and the steady 
state with the greatest stock is stable, while the other one is unstable. If the initial stock, 
s0, is such that s0 < unstables∞ , then extinction occurs in finite time. Otherwise, one of the 
two steady states with a positive stock occurs. See path a in Figure 3.1. 
If ( ) ( )MSYg s D k= , then the steady state at the MSY stock is unique and 
unstable. In that case, if s0 < sMSY, then extinction occurs in finite time. Otherwise, the 
steady state at sMSY occurs. See path b in Figure 3.1. 
If however, ( )( ) ( ) ( )g s t D k s t< ∀ , then in finite time, the resource will 
become extinct, whatever what the initial stock, s0, may be. Species that are endangered 
due to their economic over-exploitation likely exhibit this characteristic. See path c in 
Figure 3.1. 
Some level of property right enforcement, i.e., ( )t 0λ φ > , would lower the 
harvest level at any point in time, and may prevent extinction. We consider such a 
possibility in the rest of this chapter. 
In the more general case where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0> , there can be multiple steady 
states, but one at most at stocks larger than sMSY. Their stability is similar to that of the 
steady states described for the special case above. See Figure 3.2 for examples of steady 
states for the model when ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0> . In open access, extinction could be 
prevented if poaching costs are high enough, as for ka(s) in Figure 3.2. The possibility 
of extinction with open access exploitation could depend on the initial resource stock 




kc(s), extinction could be the ultimate outcome of open access exploitation, irrespective 
of the initial resource stock.  
 
3.3. Social planner's problem: total economic surplus maximization 
The social planner can use two instruments to decrease poachers' activities and 
thus steer away from the open access regime: legal harvest, ( )L tQ , and enforcement 
efforts, E(t). If the social planner harvests the resource himself, he decreases the 
poachers' market supply.  
Let ( )I tQ  be the aggregate illegal harvest. Since poaching firms are assumed to 
be identical, ( ) ( )
( )




t q * t N* t q * tQ
=
= =∑ . Furthermore, since there may be 
simultaneous legal and illegal harvest, in market equilibrium, from (3.7), we can infer 
that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )LI LE t ,Q t ,s t D k s t E t tQ Q= + λ φ − . The legal harvest cost is 
represented by a C2 function, h(QL(t),s(t)), assuming ( ) ( )( )1 Lh t ,s t 0Q > , 
( ) ( )( )11 L t ,s t 0Qh ≥ , ( ) ( )( )2 Lh t ,s t 0Q ≤ , ( ) ( )( )22 L t ,s t 0Qh ≥  and 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )211 22 12L L Lt ,s t t ,s t t ,s t 0Q Q Qh h h⎡ ⎤− ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Enforcement efforts, E(t), have 
a cost also represented by a C2 function, ( )( )c E t , for which ( )( )c ' E t 0>  and 
( )( )c '' E t 0> . The social planner can charge a per-unit harvest fine, φ, to poachers that 
he catches. We assume this fine is exogenous due to solvency constraints, which limit 
the fine that a poacher can actually pay. The exogenous fine could for example be equal 




probability of catching any and all poachers, which is represented by the C2 function 
λ(E(t)), assuming λ'(E(t)) > 0 and λ''(E(t)) < 0. Also assume that λ(0) = 0 and 
( )( )0 E t 1≤ λ < , for the domain ( )0 E t≤ < ∞ . The social planner considers the 
reproductive capacity of the renewable resource in his problem, that is, the growth 
function of the resource stock, g(s(t)), as described in section 3.1. Finally, δ is the social 
discount rate, assuming that 0 < δ < ∞ . 
The social planner is assumed to maximize the discounted inter-temporal total 
economic surplus, in contrast with poachers' equilibrium actions, which do not take the 
future into account. The expected per-unit harvest fine paid by poachers to the social 
planner is a transfer in the economy, which does not affect the total economic surplus, 
so it cancels out in the objective function. Therefore, the social planner solves the 
following problem. 
( ) ( )





L I LE t ,Q t 0 0
Max P x dx h t ,s t k s t E t , t ,s t c E t dtQ Q Q e
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where Q(t) is defined in (3.7) and x is a placeholder. 
Substituting ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )LD k s t E t tQ+ λ φ −  for ( )I tQ , the Lagrangean 
corresponding to problem (3.8), is: 






( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )




P x dx h t ,s t k D k s t E t tQ Q
c E t t g s t D k s t E t
t D k s t E t tQ
+λ φ
⎡ ⎤= − − + λ φ −∫ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− +µ − + λ φ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+γ + λ φ −⎣ ⎦
(3.9) 
where ( )H t%  is the current value Hamiltonian for problem (3.8), ( )tµ  is the 
corresponding current value co-state variable and ( )tγ  is the Lagrange multiplier on 
the inequality constraint ( ) ( ) ( )( )LI E t ,Q t ,s t 0Q ≥ . 
Using Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals where appropriate, the 
necessary conditions for this problem are given by (3.10)-(3.15). 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )L 1 LQ tL k s t h Q t ,s t t 0= − − γ ≤ , ( )L t 0Q ≥ , and  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 L Lk s t h Q t ,s t t Q t 0⎡ ⎤− − γ =⎣ ⎦ ; (3.10) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )E tL E t t t D ' ' E t c ' E t 0= λ φ−µ + γ ⋅ λ φ− ≤ , ( )E t 0≥ , 
 and ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )E t t t D ' ' E t c ' E t E t 0⎡ ⎤λ φ −µ + γ ⋅ λ φ − =⎣ ⎦ ; (3.11) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )




h Q t ,s t k ' s t Q t
D ' k ' s t E t t t
t g ' s t k ' s t D
− = µ −δµ
= −




( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )tL s t g s t Dµ = = − ⋅& ;  (3.13) 
( ) ( ) ( )LtL D Q t 0γ = ⋅ − ≥ , ( )t 0γ ≥ , ( ) ( ) ( )LD Q t t 0⋅ − γ =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ; (3.14) 
( ) t
t
lim t e 0−δ
→∞
µ ≥ , ( ) ( ) t
t
lim t s t e 0−δ
→∞




The necessary Legendre condition is verified: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )L L 11 LQ t Q tL h Q t ,s t 0= − ≤ . We assume that the necessary Legendre condition 
on E(t) also holds,6 as well as sufficient conditions for the concavity of the Hamiltonian. 
That way, first order conditions (3.10)-(3.15) are necessary and sufficient, which 
ensures a solution. 
Conditions (3.10), (3.11) and (3.14) are Kuhn-Tucker conditions allowing QL(t), 
QI(t) and E(t) to be greater than or equal to zero, leading to a total of eight possible 
cases along the optimal path, depending on the resource stock and the parameters of the 
model. It is interesting to note that dynamic optimization in this model occurs through 
enforcement only. Indeed, condition (3.10) is static and, in conjunction with (3.14), 
ensures that the total optimal harvest is provided cost-efficiently at all times. As we will 
characterize in some details below, depending on the relative legal and illegal harvest 
cost structures, either the social planner or the poachers may provide the entire harvest, 
or they might share the market. In addition, the composition of suppliers may change 
over time, as the resource stock and the corresponding optimal enforcement effort 
change. For example, if it is optimal for legal and illegal harvest to occur 
simultaneously, then (t) 0γ = . As the stock level increases, the legal harvests could 
increase or decrease, depending on the relative changes between illegal minimum 
                                                 
6 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
E t E tL D ' ' E t⎡ ⎤= ⋅ λ φ⎣ ⎦
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average harvest cost and legal marginal harvest cost; from (3.10), 








We will say that complete deterrence occurs if poaching activities are eliminated 
altogether, i.e., if ( )IQ t 0= . In contrast, partial deterrence occurs if poaching activities 
are reduced as compared to the open access scenario but are not completely eliminated, 
i.e., if ( ) ( )OAI0 Q t Q t< < . 
Equation (3.11) provides the condition for inter-temporally optimal 
enforcement. At any point in time, there will be positive enforcement only if it is not too 
costly, i.e., if ( ) ( ) E(t) 0c ' 0 (t) D ' ' (t)D ' ' (t)D ' ' =< λ φ λ φ−µ λ φ+ γ λ φ . But there will be no 
enforcement at all if it is prohibitively costly: i.e., if 
( ) ( ) E(t) 0c ' 0 (t) D ' ' (t)D ' ' (t)D ' ' =≥ λ φ λ φ−µ λ φ+ γ λ φ . In that case, enforcing the property 
right over the resource would be inefficient. This illustrates Demsetz' (1967) assertion 
that if the costs of internalization of externalities are too high, then effective property 
rights cannot be efficient. If enforcement is prohibitively costly, the social planner may 
harvest if his harvest cost is low enough relative to market inverse demand, but the 
shadow value of the resource has vanished to zero. In that case, the total harvest is the 
same as in open access regime since λ(E(t))φ = 0. The illegal harvesters could also 
harvest under open access conditions. Overall, if enforcement cost is prohibitively 
costly, demand is satisfied by either or both the social planner's and the illegal 
harvesters' supply, at the open access level: ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )L ID k s t Q s t Q s t= +  




Equation (3.12) gives the optimality condition with respect to the resource stock 
that drives (t)µ& , the change in the shadow price of the resource. Equation (3.13) gives 
back the resource transition equation. The non-negativity constraint on illegal harvest 
along with its complementary slackness conditions are found in (3.14). We note that by 
writing the upper boundary of the integral in (3.9) as ( )( ) ( )( )( )D k s t E t+ λ φ , we 
implicitly assume that even if  ( )( )IQ s t 0=  (if there is no illegal harvest), 
( )( ) ( )( )P s t k s t>  for all feasible stocks. This means that positive enforcement is 
necessary to prevent the entry of poachers into open access harvest. Finally, equation 
(3.15) is the transversality condition for the problem. 
Cases 1-3 below describe the different supply eventualities emerging from the 
relative harvest cost structures of the social planner relative to that of poachers. For all 
three cases, we assume that ( ) ( ) ( )1D 0 P 0 k s(t)− = > . This means that poachers’ 
minimum average harvest cost is lower than the choke price. Therefore, if there is no 
enforcement effort, poachers will harvest and their supply will find demanders on the 
market. We assume that the resource rent is always positive, ( )* t 0µ > . This implies 
that ( ) ( ) E(t) 0c ' 0 (t) D ' ' (t)D ' ' (t)D ' ' =< λ φ λ φ−µ λ φ+ γ λ φ , i.e., enforcement is cheap 
enough to be optimally positive. With positive optimal enforcement, the four possible 
cases arising from Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.10) and (3.14) are included within Cases 
1-3. Whether partial or complete deterrence of poaching should be achieved depends on 
the marginal cost of the social planner being constant or convex and on it being greater, 
equal to or smaller than the minimum average cost of the poachers, k(s(t)). In 




3.4 we only find partial deterrence. The situation depicted in Proposition 3.3 could lead 
to either complete or partial deterrence. Proofs of these propositions rely on Kuhn-
Tucker conditions (3.10) and (3.14). 
 
Case 1. 
In this case, assume that ( ) ( )( )D k s(t) E*(t)+ λ φ =  
( ) ( )( )L I Ls(t) * E*(t), s(t) *,s(t) 0Q Q Q+ > , i.e., the equilibrium resource supply is 
positive. Such a case implies that the market price is lower than the choke price, even 
though enforcement is positive: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1D 0 P 0 k s(t) s(t) k s(t)− = > + λ φ > . 
Propositions 3.1-3.3 refer to this case. 
 
Proposition 3.1. 
If ( ) ( )( )( )1k s(t) h D k s(t) ,s(t)> , then the entire market supply is provided by 
the social planner and poachers are completely deterred. 
Proof. 
Suppose (t) 0γ = . Since ( ) ( )( )( )1k s(t) h D k s(t) ,s(t)> , then 
L(t)Q
0L(t) > , but 
this violates Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.10). Hence, (t) 0γ > , which in turn means that 
I(t) 0Q* =  from condition (3.14). This implies ( ) ( )( )L *(t) D k s(t) s(t)Q = + λ φ .  
 
Hence, whenever the minimum average harvest cost of poachers is greater than 
the marginal harvest cost of the social planner evaluated at the market equilibrium 




efficient, which serves to maximize total economic surplus. We note that, since we 
assumed ( ) ( ) ( )P 0 k s(t) s(t)> + λ φ , and in this case, ( ) ( )( )( )1k s(t) h D k s(t) ,s(t)> , 
then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1P 0 P Q k s(t) s(t) h D k s(t) ,s(t)> = + λ > . At price ( )P Q , demand is 
positive and ( )P Q  is greater than the legal marginal cost of harvesting. This is intuitive 
since at least part of the resource rent must be used to pay for the enforcement effort. 
 
Proposition 3.2. 
If ( )( ) ( )( )( )1k s t h D k s(t) ,s(t)< , then the entire market supply is provided by 
the poachers and poaching can at best be partially deterred. 
Proof. 
Since (t) 0γ ≥  and ( )( ) ( )( )( )1k s t h D k s(t) ,s(t)< , then 
L(t)Q
0L(t) <  and hence 
L(t) 0Q* = . Since ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )L I LD k s(t) ,s(t) t t ,s t 0Q Q Q= + > , then it must be that 
( )( ) ( )( )I s t D k s(t) ,s(t)Q* = . If E(s(t)) = 0, then D = D(k(s(t))) and open access results, 
i.e., poaching is not deterred at all. But if E(s(t)) > 0, we know that 
( )( ) ( )( )( )D k s(t) ,s(t) D k s t<  and partial deterrence occurs, that is, poachers are still 
active, but less than they would be under open access.  
 
Proposition 3.2 says that whenever the minimum average harvest cost of the 
poachers is less than the marginal cost of the social planner evaluated at the market 







Suppose a constant legal harvest marginal cost, ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 Lh Q s t ,s t h s t=  
for all ( )( )L s tQ . If ( )( ) ( )( )k s t h s t= , then QI*(s(t)) and QL*(s(t)) are indeterminate 
but satisfy ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )L ID k s(t) ,s(t) s t s tQ* Q*= + . 
Proof. 
Suppose ( )t 0γ > . Since ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Lk s t h t ,s tQ= , then ( )L tQ 0L <  and 
( )L t 0Q = , in order to satisfy condition (3.10). Also, ( )I t 0Q =  to satisfy condition 
(3.14). This leads to ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )L I LD k s(t) ,s(t) t t ,s t 0Q Q Q= + = , which is contrary 
to our assumption. Hence, ( )t 0γ = . Then ( )L tQ 0L =  satisfies condition (3.10), which 
means that ( )( )L s t 0Q* ≥ . Since ( )t 0γ = , ( )( )I s t 0Q* ≥  as well. The share of legal to 
illegal harvest is however indeterminate.  
 
Proposition 3.3 applies to the restrictive case where the social planner's marginal 
harvest cost is constant and equal to those of the poachers. Any distribution of the total 




Assume that the social planner's harvest cost function is strictly convex in QL. 




cost and the illegal minimum average harvest cost are equal at one harvest quantity 
only, i.e., for all s(t), ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Lk s t h Q t ,s t=  has a unique implicit solution, which 
we now define. 
 
Definition 3.2. 
Under Assumption 3.1, let us define the harvest quantity at which the legal 
marginal harvest cost and the illegal minimum average harvest cost are equal as 
( )( )Q s t% . Therefore ( )( )Q s t%  is defined by an implicit function, ( )f ⋅ , which depends on 
the resource stock and on the legal and illegal harvest technologies: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )LQ s t f k s t , h Q s t ,s t=% . 
 
Assumption 3.2. 
Under Assumption 3.1, further assume that ( )( ) ( )( )D k s(t) ,s(t) Q s t> %  so that 
( )( ) ( )( )L s t Q s tQ = % . 
 
Under Assumption 3.2, there exists a legal harvest quantity, QL(t) such that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Lk s t h Q t ,s t= . This intersection of marginal costs implicitly defines the 
legal harvest quantity ( )( ) ( )( )L s t Q s tQ = % , as long as ( )( ) ( )( )D k s(t) ,s(t) Q s t> % . This 








Under Assumption 3.2, ( )( ) ( )( )( )L I LQ* * s t * s tQ Q Q= + =  
( )( ) ( )( )D k s(t) ,s(t) Q s t 0> >% , i.e., the equilibrium resource supply is positive and it is 
greater than ( )sQ~ , the harvest quantity where the social planner's marginal harvest cost 
curve crosses the poachers' minimum average harvest cost level. Proposition 3.4 refers 
to this case. We suppose again that enforcement is positive, although this assumption 
could be relaxed for Proposition 3.4. 
 
Proposition 3.4. 
Under the assumptions of Case 2, the social planner will supply ( )( )Q s t%  to the 
market while the poachers will provide the rest of the total optimal supply: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )I Q s t ,s t D k s t ,s t Q s t 0Q = − >% % . 
Proof. 
This proof proceeds in a piecewise fashion. 
First, for ( )LQ 0,Q s⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦% , we have that ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Lk s t t ,s tQh≥ . Suppose 
( )t 0γ = . Then ( )L tQ 0L > , which violates Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.10).  
Hence, ( )t 0γ > , which in turn means that ( )I t 0Q =  from condition (3.14). 
Since it is assumed that ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )L I LD k s t ,s t t s t ,s t Q sQ Q Q= + > % , then 




Second, for ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )(LQ Q s , D k s t ,s t ⎤∈ ⎦% , we have that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Lk s t h Q t ,s t< . Since ( )t 0γ ≥ , ( )L tQ 0L <  and hence it is not optimal for 
legal harvest to exceed ( )Q s% . 
Finally, since ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )L I LD k s t ,s t s t t ,s tQ Q Q= + , we have that 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )IQ * s t D k s t ,s t Q s= − % .  
 
Proposition 3.4 says that when the social planner's marginal harvest cost is 
strictly convex and therefore crosses poachers' minimum average harvest cost at one 
point, ( )( )Q s t% , then if ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )D k s t ,s t Q s t> % , the social planner's harvest is 
( )( ) ( )( )*LQ s t Q s t= %  and the poachers' harvest is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )*IQ s t D k s t ,s t Q s t⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦% . 
 
Let us remark that the case, still under Assumption 3.1, where 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* *L LIQ s t Q s t ,s t D k s t ,s t Q s tQ+ = < %  is included in the more 
general Proposition 3.1. 
 
It seems noteworthy that, in the absence of fully controlled access to the 
resource, it could be optimal for poachers to provide the entire market supply ad 
infinitum while the social planner only monitors and limits their activities through 




example where it could be optimal for the supply to the market to be shared across legal 
and illegal harvesters. Hence this model shows clearly that the presence and possibly 
even the persistence of a black market7 is not necessarily an indication that resource 
management policy is nonexistent or sub-optimal. With costly enforcement, this 
situation could be second best optimal and, in such a case, the existence of a black 
market would be justified by the relative marginal harvest costs across legal and illegal 
harvesters. 
Indeed, when the poachers’ minimum average harvest cost is lower than the 
social planner’s marginal harvest cost, it is cost-efficient for the social planner to let the 
poachers harvest in his place. This is conceptually equivalent to the social planner 
delegating its harvest to poachers who can do it at a lower cost, which is welfare 
increasing for society. 
 
Case 3. 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* *L LID k s t ,s t Q s t Q s t ,s t 0Q= + = , i.e., in equilibrium, there 
is no supply to the market. This case is limited neither by Assumption 3.1 nor by 
Assumption 3.2. 
Since, from the beginning, we have assumed that ( ) ( ) ( )1D 0 P 0 k s(t)− = > , for 
this case to arise, enforcement is necessary so that price is raised up to the choke price: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )k s(t) s t P 0+ λ φ = . 
                                                 




Since enforcement is costly and in this case there is no instantaneous welfare 
due to harvest, then the social planner must be investing in the future by letting the 
resource stock replenish itself. This situation can only be transitory the instantaneous 
welfare effect is negative. Hence in Case 3, we know that resource harvest will resume 
at some later point in time. 
 
Cases 1 and 2 referred to situations that could hold both in the short run, along 
the optimal path, or in the long-run, i.e., in a steady state equilibrium, depending on the 
initial stock level, s0, and on the parameters of the model. In contrast, Case 3 refers to 
clear-cut transitory situations because instantaneous welfare is negative. 
 
3.3.1. Optimal steady states 
An optimal steady state equilibrium exists, for a vector ( )* * * * *L, I,s ,Q ,Q ,E ,∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞µ  
such that necessary conditions (3.10) to (3.15) hold, as well as L Is E 0Q Q= = = = µ =& && && . 
In the special case where instantaneous gains are not stock-dependent, i.e., 
where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0= , ( )( )2 Lh Q ,s t 0=  and ( )( )F' s t 0= , there is only one possible 
optimal steady state. Indeed, from necessary condition (3.12), the unique steady state is 
such that ( ){ }*s inf s : g ' s∞ = ≤ δ . Since s(t) ≥ 0, ( ){ }*s inf s : g ' s∞ = ≤ δ  includes the 
possibility of extinction if ( )g ' 0δ ≥  and the possibility of long run conservation if 




For the steady state analysis that follows, we assume that ( )g ' 0δ < , which 
means that the optimal steady state stock is positive. We also assume that the unique 
optimal steady state is consistent with Case 2. Still assuming that instantaneous gains 
are not stock-dependent, under Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2, which lead to Case 
2, there exists a steady state legal harvest quantity, *L,Q ∞  such that ( )*L,k h ' Q ∞= . This 
intersection of marginal costs implicitly defines the steady state legal harvest quantity 
*
L,Q Q∞ = % , as long as ( )( )*D k E Q∞+ λ φ > % . This leads to a steady state equilibrium 
where both the social planner and poachers harvest the resource. 
If a species that is harvested enough to be economically scarce in steady state, 
then * 0∞µ > , which implies that 
*E 0∞ > . 
A positive steady state stock and (3.13), imply that ( ) ( )( )* *g s D k E∞ ∞= + λ φ . In 
addition, from (3.12), the golden rule of economic growth applies: ( )*g ' s∞ = δ . Hence, 
the only steady state variable that remains to be found is *E∞ , the enforcement level, 
which in turn will determine ( )* *LI E ,QQ ∞ ∞ , or simply ( )*IQ E∞  since in the case 
considered, *L,Q Q∞ = %  is pegged. At the stock level where ( )*g ' s∞δ = , the enforcement 
level must be such that ( ) ( )( ) ( )* * *I E ;Q Q D k E g sQ ∞ ∞ ∞+ = + λ φ =% % . Figure 3.3 illustrates 
this steady state. The top graph looks like the typical textbook optimum steady state 
when harvest costs are not stock-dependent, only with the Q- and s-axes flipped as 




graph is a modified version of the textbook graph of a static free entry dominant firm-
competitive fringe model (e.g., Carlton and Perloff (1994), p. 168). 
 
Figure 3.3. Steady State Equilibrium; No Stock Dependence 
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In the more general case, where harvest costs are stock-dependent, assuming 
that ( ) ( )* *g s Q s∞ ∞> % , we find from necessary conditions (3.11) and (3.12) that 
( ) ( )( )2 L* 2
D ' ' h k ' D Q D'k 'c '
g ' s
D ' ' c '∞
λ φ + − −
= δ +
λ λφ −
, where arguments of functions have 
been left out for brevity. The second right hand side term has a negative denominator. 
The firs term of the numerator is negative, pushing towards a greater steady state stock, 
than where ( )*g ' s∞ = δ , while the second term of the numerator is negative, pushing 
towards a smaller steady state stock than where ( )*g ' s∞ = δ . Since the second right hand 
side term could be overall positive or negative, depending on the parameters of the 
model, we conclude that a positive steady state stock could be greater or smaller than 
when harvest costs are not stock dependent. This differs from the costless enforcement 
model where the steady state stock is always greater under stock-dependent harvest 
costs. The possibility of a lower steady state stock arises here because of the structure of 
the model where price is endogenous and depends on the stock level and the 





tKk ' s t 0
tq
= < , a higher stock 
does not only lower harvest costs, it also lowers the market price since ( ) λφ+= skP . 
Given that the demand is downward-sloping, this increases the equilibrium quantity 
harvested, which in turn lowers the resource stock. Hence, the overall effect of the 
stock-dependence of harvest costs on the steady state resource stock is unclear. 
Furthermore in the more general model, multiple optimal steady states could 




could depend on the parameters of the model and possibly also on the initial stock level, 
0s . Without any specification of functions however, little can be said about long run 
outcomes. In Chapter 4, we present a model with some level of function specification 
which allows us to compare phase diagrams with and without a fixed flow of resource 
management costs. 
 
3.3.2. Equilibrium paths 
For the special case where instantaneous gains are not stock-dependent, i.e., 
where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0=  and ( )( )2 Lh Q ,s t 0= , we characterize the equilibrium paths 
with optimal positive enforcement. The more general case, where ( )( )2 IK q ,s t 0>  and 
( )( )2 Lh Q ,s t 0> , is substantially more complicated; paths are difficult to characterize, 
unless the functions are specified. Therefore, we concentrate on the simpler version of 
the model. 
 
 Resource stock. 
From (3.12), we obtain ( ) ( ) ( )( )t t g ' s t⎡ ⎤µ = µ δ −⎣ ⎦& . Therefore, as long as 
( )g ' 0δ ≤ , there can exist only one positive steady state stock, where g'(s) = δ. This 
problem is an autonomous infinite horizon problem with positive discount rate and a 
unique stock. This means that the resource stock path is monotonic over time (Long, 




( )( )( )g ' s t 0δ − < , then by the strict concavity of g(s) and the monotonicity of the 
resource stock path, ( )s t 0>& , and vice versa. 
 
In what follows, we consider cases with strictly legal supply, i.e., cases where 
( )L t 0Q >  but ( )I t 0Q = , and hence ( ) ( )( )( )L t D k E tQ = + λ φ . From equations (3.10) 
and (3.14), a positive supply that is strictly legal implies ( ) ( )( )Lt k h ' t 0Qγ = − ≥ , 
which leads to ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )L LLt h '' t t h '' t D ' ' E tQ QQγ = − = − λ φ && & . 
 
 Co-state variable, with strictly legal supply. 
 We find ( )tµ&  directly in (3.12), where we substitute µ  from equation (3.11): 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )c 't E t k h ' g ' s tD ' '
⎡ ⎤
µ = λ φ+ − − δ −⎢ ⎥λ φ⎣ ⎦
&  
Since ( )( ) ( )c 'E t k h ' t 0
D ' '
⎡ ⎤
λ φ+ − − = µ >⎢ ⎥λ φ⎣ ⎦
, the sign of ( )tµ&  is the same as the sign 
of ( )( )( )g ' s tδ − , and therefore the opposite sign as ( )s t& . 
 




We totally differentiate (3.11) with respect to time. We then substitute ( )tµ&  
from (3.12) and ( ) ( ) ( )Lt h '' Q tγ = − ⋅ && , as explained above, and we find the optimal 
enforcement path  
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
LE t E t
D ' ' E t t c ' E t g ' s t
E t
H t D ' ' h '' Q t





where ( ) ( ) ( )E t E tH t 0≤%  by assumption of concavity of the Hamiltonian. Since 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )D' ' E t t c ' E t t D ' ' 0⎡ ⎤λ φ λ φ+ γ − = µ λ φ <⎣ ⎦  and since the denominator is 
negative, then it follows that the sign of ( )E t&  is the same as the sign of ( )( )( )g ' s tδ − , 
and therefore the opposite sign as ( )s t& . The enforcement path is therefore monotonic, 
like that of the resource stock. 
 
In what follows, we now consider cases with illegal supply, i.e., cases where 
( )I t 0Q >  and ( )L t 0Q ≥ . These cases encompass situations where supply is partially or 
completely illegal. With illegal supply, from equations (3.10) and (3.14), we know that 
( )( )( ) ( )LD k E t t 0Q+ λ φ − > , ( )t 0γ =  and therefore ( )t 0γ =& . 
 
Co-state variable, with illegal supply. 
We find ( )tµ&  directly in (3.12), where we substitute ( )tµ  from equation (3.11): 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )c 't E t g ' s tD ' '
⎡ ⎤





As in the case with strictly legal supply, because ( )( ) ( )c 'E t t 0
D ' '
⎡ ⎤
λ φ− = µ >⎢ ⎥λ φ⎣ ⎦
 here, 
the sign of ( )tµ&  is the same as the sign of ( )( )( )g ' s tδ − , and therefore the opposite 
sign as ( )s t& . 
 
Enforcement, with illegal supply. 
Following the same steps as for the strictly legal supply, but using ( )t 0γ =&  
instead, we obtain 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )E t E t
D ' ' E t c ' g ' s t
E t
H t
⎡ ⎤λ φλ φ− δ −⎣ ⎦=&
%
, 
where again ( ) ( ) ( )E t E tH t 0≤%  by assumption of concavity of the Hamiltonian. Since the 
denominator and ( )( ) ( )D' ' E t c ' t D ' '⎡ ⎤λ φλ φ− = µ λ φ⎣ ⎦  are both negative, then the sign 
of ( )E t&  is the same as the sign of ( )( )( )g ' s tδ −  or the opposite sign as ( )s t& . This is 
qualitatively similar to the case with strictly legal supply. Again, the enforcement path 
is monotonic. When the initial stock is below the optimal steady state, enforcement is 
high, but as the stock increases, enforcement declines. Likewise, if the initial stock is 
larger than the optimal steady state, then enforcement is small but it increases as 
harvesting reduces the stock size. 
 
We note that the total harvest moves in the opposite direction as enforcement, 






We mentioned before that if the resource is exploited in open access only, 
without any probability of paying a fine, then the number of harvesters was constant 
independent of time and of the resource stock. However, with a social planner (or a 
pseudo-monopolist as in section 3.4), who can harvest legally while poachers could 
simultaneously harvest illegally, the total equilibrium harvest is equal to 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )* *I L LQ s t D k s t E* s t Q E* s t ,Q s t Q s t= + λ φ = + , (3.16) 
that is, the sum of illegal harvests aggregated over poachers, QI, and the legal harvest, 
QL. If there is some positive level of enforcement, so that ( )t 0λ φ > , then the number 
of poachers is reduced compared to the open access regime since 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )Q s t D k s t E* s t D k s t= + λ φ < , whether ( )( )*LQ s t 0>  or not. 
Hence some positive level of deterrence occurs as long as ( )t 0λ φ > . 
 
3.4. Pseudo-monopolist problem: profit maximization and corrective 
policies 
In this section we examine the problem of a pseudo-monopolist, who legally 
exploits the resource and enforces his property rights in order to maximize inter-
temporal profit without regard for the welfare of consumers and poachers. It is assumed 
that the pseudo-monopolist keeps the fines collected from poachers. From a global 
perspective, the pseudo-monopolist's behavior is consistent with an individual country's 
government that manages an exportable renewable resource without regard to domestic 




monopolist's behavior is consistent with that of a private resource owner who is only 
interested in making discounted inter-temporal profits from the resource. 
From the predicted poachers' behavior, we substitute P using market equilibrium 
condition (3.6), i.e., ( ) ( )( ) ( )P t k s t t= + λ φ  and Q using equation (3.7), i.e., 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Q t D k s t t= + λ φ . We also make use of identity (3.16), i.e., 
( )( ) ( )( )( )( )D k s t E* s t+ λ φ =  ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )* *I L LQ E* s t ,Q s t Q s t+ , so the pseudo-
monopolist's problem can be written as follows. 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )L
L L t
E t , tQ 0
k s t t h t ,s tQ Q
e dtMax





+λ φ + λ φ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (3.17) 
subject to: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )




s t g s t D k s t E t
s t 0 s is given
s t ,E t , t 0, t,Q
t D k s t E t t 0, t,Q Qand
= − + λ φ
= =
≥ ∀
= + λ φ − ≥ ∀
&
 
with variables defined as in (3.8). 
The Lagrangean for problem (3.17) is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )LL t H t t D k s t E t tQ⎡ ⎤= + γ + λ φ −⎣ ⎦%  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
L L
L
k s t t h t ,s t E t D k s t E tQ Q
c E t t g s t D k s t E t
t D k s t E t tQ
= − + λ φ + λ φ
⎡ ⎤− +µ − + λ φ⎣ ⎦





where ( )H t%  is the current value Hamiltonian corresponding to problem (3.17), ( )tµ  is 
the corresponding current value co-state variable and γ(t) the corresponding Lagrange 
multiplier on the constraint ( )I t 0Q ≥ . 
The necessary conditions for this problem are given by (3.19)-(3.24). 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )L t 1Q Lk s t t ,s t t 0QL h= − − γ ≤ , ( )L t 0Q ≥ , and  
 ( ) ( )( ) 0Qs,Qhsk LL1 =γ−− ; (3.19) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )E t ' E t D E t t t D ' ' E t c ' E t 0L = λ φ ⋅ + λ φ−µ + γ ⋅ λ φ− ≤  
( )E t 0≥ , and 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
' E t D
E t t t D ' ' E t E t 0
c ' E t
⎛ ⎞λ φ ⋅
⎜ ⎟




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
s t 2 L Lt t t ,s t k ' s t tQ QL h
D' k ' s t E t t t  - t g ' s t
− = µ −δµ = −
− ⋅ λ φ−µ + γ µ
&
 (3.21) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )t t s t g s t DL Hµ µ= = = − ⋅% & ; (3.22) 
( ) ( ) ( )t LD t 0QLγ = ⋅ − ≥ , ( )t 0γ ≥ , ( ) ( )( ) ( )LD t t 0Q⋅ − γ = ; (3.23) 
( ) t
t
lim t e 0−δ
→∞
µ ≥ , ( ) ( ) t
t
lim t s t e 0−δ
→∞




The first Legendre condition holds: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )L Lt t 11Q Q L t ,s t 0QL h= − ≤ . We 
assume that Legendre condition on E(t) holds as well,8 and that all sufficient conditions 
are satisfied, so that the necessary conditions (3.19)-(3.24) are necessary and sufficient. 
First we notice that the necessary conditions above are the same as those found 
for the social planner, except for (3.20), which differs from (3.11). Hence, for a given 
total supply to the market, the split between legal (here, the pseudo-monopolist's) and 
illegal (poachers') harvests is the same as it would be for the social planner. This least-
cost provision of the resource good to the market is dependent on the fact that the 
pseudo-monopolist keeps the fines he collects. This way, the marginal harvest cost of 
poachers vis-à-vis that of the pseudo-monopolist dictates who supplies the resource to 
the market, just as they did in the social planner's problem. Therefore, cases 1-3 and 
Propositions 3.1-3.4 hold for the pseudo-monopolist's problem, with a slightly different 
notation (no upper-bars above variables and functions). 
In a model with exogenous price, but endogenous legal harvest and 
enforcement, Milliman (1986) pointed out that "total gain maximization" is formally 
equivalent to the maximization of legal gains augmented by fine payments (p.379). He 
suggested that total economic surplus advocates (as opposed to legal surplus only) 
should consider allowing resource managers to keep the fines collected from illegal 
                                                 
8 That is, ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
E t E tL '' E t D 2 ' E t D '⎡ ⎤= λ φ ⋅ + λ φ ⋅⎣ ⎦  
  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
E t t t D '' ' E t D ' '' E t
c '' E t
0.







fishermen in order to trigger optimal behavior. Here however, this is not sufficient to 
trigger optimality because price is endogenous and is a source of rent-seeking by the 
pseudo-monopolist who uses enforcement to his advantage. Indeed, the total supply 
(i.e., legal plus illegal harvests) to the market for a given resource stock differs from 
that of the social planner, and therefore the pseudo-monopolist's behavior is sub-
optimal. This occurs because the first term in (3.20) does not appear in (3.11), which 
means that the equilibrium enforcement level will differ from the social optimum. Since 
the resource price is in part determined by the enforcement level, it follows that the 
equilibrium supply to the market will be sub-optimal. 
3.4.1. Corrective policies 
A policy can be put in place to rectify the pseudo-monopolist's behavior. Indeed, 
the social planner can influence the pseudo-monopolist by subsidizing him by the 
amount of the consumer surplus. 
 
Proposition 3.5. 
The pseudo-monopolist could be subsidized at each point in time by the amount 
of the consumer surplus in order to make him behave optimally. This subsidy is: 
 ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
D k s t E t
0
Ŝ t P x dx k s t E t D
+λ φ
= − + λ φ ⋅∫  (3.25) 
Proof. 
( )L t  is the Lagrangian (3.9) for the inter-temporal economic surplus 




maximization problem. Since ( ) ( ) ( )Ŝ t L t L t= − , the subsidy (3.25) makes the pseudo-
monopolist behave optimally because it redefines his problem and renders it equivalent 
to that of the social planner: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ˆL̂ t L t S t L t L t L t L t= + = + − = .  
 
Alternatively, the social planner can influence the pseudo-monopolist by 
requesting that a royalty on the resource be paid to the government. 
 
Proposition 3.6. 
The optimal royalty to be paid by the pseudo-monopolist at each point in time is 
 ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )k s t E t
0
t D x dx
+λ φ
ℜ = ∫ . (3.26) 
Proof. 
The redefined pseudo-monopolist's problem can be written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
L L
L
L t L t t
k s t t h t ,s t E t D k s t E tQ Q
c E t t g s t D k s t E t
t D k s t E t t t .Q
= −ℜ
= − + λ φ + λ φ
⎡ ⎤− +µ − + λ φ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+γ + λ φ − −ℜ⎣ ⎦
  (3.27) 
The necessary conditions for problem (3.27) are given by (3.28)-(3.33). 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )LL tQ LtQ k s t t ,s t t 0QhL = − − γ ≤ , ( )L t 0Q ≥ , and  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )L tQ L Lk s t t ,s t t t 0Q Qh− − γ = ; (3.28) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )E t E t t t D ' ' E t c ' E t 0L = λ φ−µ + γ ⋅ λ φ− ≤ , ( )E t 0≥ , and  




( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
s t
s t L L
t tL
t ,s t k ' s t tQ Qh
D' k ' s t E t t t - t g ' s t k ' s t D
− = µ −δµ
= −
− ⋅ λ φ−µ + γ µ + ⋅
&
 (3.30) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )t s t g s t DLµ = = − ⋅& ;  (3.31) 
( ) ( ) ( )Lt D t 0QLγ = ⋅ − ≥ , ( )t 0γ ≥ , ( ) ( )( ) ( )LD t t 0Q⋅ − γ = ; (3.32) 
( ) t
t
lim t e 0−δ
→∞
µ ≥ , ( ) ( ) t
t
lim t s t e 0−δ
→∞
µ = .  (3.33) 
 
Conditions (3.28)-(3.33) are the same as (3.10)-(3.15), and hence, the royalty 
suggested in (3.26) influences the pseudo-monopolist to behave optimally at the 
margin.  
 
Even though the policy suggested in Proposition 3.6 triggers the right behavior 
at the margin and may at first glance seem preferable to the policy suggested in 
Proposition 3.5, it would be difficult to implement. Indeed, the optimal royalty 
represents the area to the left of the inverse demand curve between zero and the 
equilibrium price level. The larger QI, the smaller the harvest net revenue for the 
pseudo-monopolist, but he still needs to pay the royalty over the entire equilibrium 
quantity, ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )LL ID k s t E t t E t ,Q t ,s tQ Q+ λ φ = + . Hence, the more 
likely will the pseudo-monopolist’s equilibrium behavior result in a negative value for 
the Lagrangian. In such an instance the pseudo-monopolist would prefer to shut down 




Note that, in the special case where the harvest costs are not stock-dependent, 
the pseudo-monopolist's enforcement level is sub-optimal in the short run but not in the 
long run. That is because the pseudo-monopolist's steady state is the same as the social 
planner's: ( )*g ' s∞ = δ . Therefore, in that special case, once the steady state is reached, 
no more corrective policy is necessary for the pseudo-monopolist to behave optimally. 
Another alternative when the legal harvester is a pseudo-monopolist is that the 
resource planner be responsible for enforcement. However, the fines collected would 
have to be given back to the pseudo-monopolist for him to harvest optimally. This way, 
the enforcement level can be optimal, and both legal and illegal harvesters would react 
cost-effectively to it. The disadvantage of this approach is that external budget, such as 
government spending, must be devoted to enforcement while the resource rents and 
profits do not accrue to a governmental agency. In countries where the government is 
relatively poor, this would not likely be feasible. 
3.4.2. Equilibrium paths 
If one of the above policies is put in place, then the equilibrium paths occur as 
those found for the social planners' problem. The analysis of section 3.2.1 therefore 
holds for the regulated pseudo-monopolist. 
3.4.3. Steady state equilibrium 
Similarly, if the above policies are put in place, then the same long run 
equilibria occur as those found in the social planners' problem. The analysis of section 




For the special case where the harvest cost is not stock-dependent, then at the 
unique steady state, a corrective policy is no longer necessary however. This is because 
the unique steady state of the social planner and the pseudo monopolist coincide, as 
long as the pseudo-monopolist discounts the future at the social discount rate, δ. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
A model that is more general than previous models with costly enforcement of 
property rights over a renewable resource was presented in this chapter. Indeed, the 
price of the resource, the legal harvest level and the property right enforcement level 
were all endogenously determined in a dynamic version of the dominant-firm-
competitive-fringe model of industrial organization. Moreover, different relative harvest 
cost structures across legal and illegal harvesters were allowed. We showed that, given 
the marginal harvest costs of the legal harvester relative to that of the poachers, it could 
be optimal to have a positive and persistent black market. Hence, the presence of a 
black market does not necessarily indicate that resource management policy is 
inexistent or sub-optimal; it could simply be better to have some illegal harvest than 
none when enforcement is costly. 
Furthermore, with a resource that has market value only, we've shown that if the 
pseudo-monopolist is allowed to keep the fines collected from poachers, he will insure 
that the total harvest is provided cost-effectively. His level of enforcement will in 
general be sub-optimal however, and if it is, a corrective policy is required to trigger 





CHAPTER 4. THE OPTIMAL EXTINCTION OF A RENEWABLE 
NATURAL RESOURCE WITH COSTLY MANAGEMENT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we make use of a model developed by Cropper et al. (1979) for 
the problem of a benevolent social planner who chooses the optimal harvest level of a 
renewable resource over the infinite horizon. We do this for two reasons: 1) in order to 
gain more insight into the model with costly management and stock-dependent harvest 
cost, we must specify some functions as compared to the more general model in 
Chapter 3; 2) in order to compare the phase diagrams of the social planner’s 
management decisions with and without costly management so we can see the impact of 
costly management on long run equilibrium. 
Cropper et al. (1979) have specified a harvest cost function that depends on the 
resource stock but is linear in harvest quantity. We make the same assumption, but 
instead of considering variable enforcement cost, as in Chapter 3, here we assume an 
instantaneous flow of fixed cost of resource management, M > 0. This simplification is 
necessary in order to analyze phase diagrams. Indeed, the model with variable 




dependent as in Cropper et al. (1979).9 Thus we still have positive transaction costs of 
resource management, but here it is not explicitly related to illegal behavior. Instead, we 
can think of the planner charging a per-unit harvest tax, ( )tτ , to the harvesters, while 
collecting and redistributing the tax incurs a fixed cost, M, at each point in time, which 
is independent of the tax level and time. If however the planner decided not to collect 
the tax, then M = 0, and the resulting exploitation regime of the resource would be open 
access. 
When resource management is costly, open access may be preferred to effective 
management if the cost of management is too high for a given stock level. In fact, there 
could be resource management regime switches between open access and effective 
costly management as the resource stock changes over time. In order to consider 
management regime switches, let us define the overall resource manager's problem in 
two simultaneous stages. 
The second stage, which must be solved before the first one, includes two 
Management problems: the harvesters’ problem under open access exploitation, and the 
social planner's costly management problem. Under open access, harvesters choose 
their equilibrium harvest assuming entry until they reach zero profit. Under costly 
                                                 
9 Assuming a well behaved model with costly enforcement of property rights and 
Cropper et al.’s other model specifications, steady states do not exist in the positive 
quadrant. Conversely, assuming steady states in the positive quadrant, that model is not 
well-behaved. This is why the costly management specification is simplified to an 




management, the manager chooses the tax, τ , that will trigger second best optimal 
harvest behavior. These two management problems are solved in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
The first stage is the social planner's Timing Problem for management regime 
switches across open access and costly management (or vice versa). Once the planner 
knows his second best optimal choice of tax, ( )tτ , and the equilibrium choice of harvest 
by the harvesters under either regime, he must choose the best management regime as 
well as the timing of management regime switches. The Timing Problem is solved in 
section 4.4. Then in section 4.5, we characterize the phase diagrams for the problem 
with fixed flow cost of management with the possibility of management regime 
switches. In section 4.6, we conclude. 
4.2. Harvesters' problem 
In this model, we suppose that harvesters are homogeneous, and they all have a 
right to harvest. Individual harvesters do not own the resource, so they are static 
optimizers who operate in open access. At any point in time, t, a harvester takes the 
resource market price, P, and the per-unit tax, ( )tτ , as given. An individual harvester's 
continuous and twice differentiable harvest cost function is ( ) ( )K(s t )q t , where q is the 
amount of the resource an individual harvests, s is the resource stock and K(s(t)) is the 
marginal cost of harvesting. Here we assume that ( )K '(s t ) 0<  and ( )K ''(s t ) 0≥ . There 
is no fixed cost of harvest. A harvester's problem is to maximize his profit, π (t): 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
q t
Max t P t q t K s t q t t q t
P t K s t t q t
π = − − τ
⎡ ⎤= − − τ⎣ ⎦
 




 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )q t P t K s t t 0π = − − τ = . (4.1) 
The open access regime will lead to entry until all expected rents are dissipated, 
so that, in equilibrium, we obtain for each harvester: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )t P t K s t t q t 0⎡ ⎤π = − − τ =⎣ ⎦ . (4.2) 
Equating (4.1) to (4.2) leads to the conclusion that in open access, the number of 
harvesters is indeterminate, as well as the quantity harvested by each one of them, due 
to the perfect competition among them and their constant per-unit harvest cost, for a 
given stock level, K(s). The total quantity harvested, ( ) ( )Q t q t= ∑ , is determinate 
however as it occurs at the equilibrium between supply and demand. On the supply side, 
the market price is affected by the resource stock level, s(t), and the resource planner's 
tax, ( )tτ . Indeed, by combining (4.1) and (4.2), one can infer the price level, given the 
harvester's behavior, to be 
 ( )( ) ( )P K s t t= + τ . (4.3) 
Given the downward-sloping inverse demand curve ( )( )P Q t , the market 
equilibrium for the total quantity harvested and consumed is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1Q t P K s t t D K s t t−= + τ = + τ . (4.4) 
A positive tax will lead to a smaller total harvest, since D'(t) < 0: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )OAQ s t , t D K s t t D K s t s tQτ = + τ < = , where ( )( )OA s tQ  is the 
open access total harvest at stock level s. Hence some positive level of resource 
management will occur, i.e., harvest will be lower than under open access, as long as 




4.2.1. Equilibrium paths and steady states under open access exploitation 
The phase diagram of open access exploitaiton in (Q,s)-space is relatively 
simple. First, the equation of motion for the resource is ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )s t g s t Q s t= −&  and we 
assume g(s) to be a compensatory biological growth function. The steady state locus 
( )s t 0=&  is plotted as ( )( ) ( )( )g s t Q s t= . We need to understand harvesting behaviour as 
the resource stock varies. Assuming open access, ( )t 0τ = , and from (4.4) harvest is 
equal to ( )( ) ( )( )( )Q s t D K s t= . As s increases, harvest increases as well because the 
inverse demand is downward-sloping and the harvest cost decreases with stock: 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )Q' s t D ' K s t K ' s t 0= > . Sample equilibrium paths with three different 
harvest costs, Ka(s) > Kb(s) > Kc(s), are illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. Equilibrium paths and steady states in open access; ( )( )K ' s t 0>  
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          ( ) ( )( )OAa aQ s D K s=  
 
                 0s =&  
 
 
           0      unstableb,s ∞          stableb,s ∞  sMSY  stablea,s ∞       s          s 





In Figure 4.1, we see that there can be multiple steady states, but one at most at 
stocks larger than sMSY, for which g'(s) < 0. In open access, extinction can be prevented 
if harvesting costs are high enough, such as for Ka(s) in Figure 4.1. The possibility of 
extinction with open access exploitation could depend on the initial resource stock for 
lower harvesting costs, as for Kb(s), where if s0 < unstableb,s ∞  extinction eventually occurs 
but not otherwise. Finally, for low enough harvesting costs, such as Kc(s), extinction is 
the ultimate outcome of open access exploitation, irrespective of the initial resource 
stock.  
 
4.3. Social planner's costly management problem 
The resource planner's problem is to find the optimal total harvest over time, 
Q(t), given s(t), that will maximize the flow of discounted social welfare as measured 
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⎡ ⎤
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where M is the instantaneous fixed cost due to resource management, and x is a 
placeholder. 







( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
Q t
0
H P x dx K s t Q t M t g s t Q t= − − +µ −∫%  (4.6) 
where µ  is the current value co-state variable or shadow value of the resource. Using 
Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals where appropriate and assuming an interior 
solution, the necessary conditions for this problem are as follow. 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )Q tH P Q t K s t t 0= − −µ =%  (4.7) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )s tH t t K ' s t Q t t g ' s t− = µ −µ δ = −µ% &  (4.8) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )tH s t g s t Q tµ = = −% &   (4.9) 
( ) t
t T
lim t e 0−δ
→
µ ≥ , ( ) ( ) t
t T
lim t s t e 0−δ
→
µ = . (4.10) 
For an interior solution, the necessary Legendre condition holds: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )Q t Q tH P ' Q t 0= <% . Further, we have ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )s t s tH K '' s t t g '' s t 0= − +µ <% , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )Q t s tH K ' s t 0= − >% , and we assume that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
Q t Q t s t s t Q t s tH H H 0− ≥% % % , which 
implies the concavity of the Hamiltonian and guarantees a solution to this problem. 
4.3.1. Phase diagrams for the costly management problem 
Assuming T= ∞, the phase diagrams with costless resource management are 
analyzed in Cropper et al. (1979). A summary is presented in Appendix II. 
We want to plot the phase diagram in (s,Q)-space for problem (4.5), i.e., for the 
Cropper et al. (1979) model only a fixed flow cost of resource management, M. We 
therefore need two loci: ( ) ( )( )s s t ,Q t 0=&  and ( ) ( )( )Q s t ,Q t 0=& . The first one is 




one, we use the first two necessary conditions, (4.7) and (4.8). First we differentiate 
(4.7) with respect to time and we obtain ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
K ' s t s t t
Q t




& . From (4.9), we 
can substitute ( )( ) ( )g s t Q t⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  for s& . From (4.7) and (4.8), we can substitute 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )t P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t Q t⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤µ = − δ − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦&  for ( )tµ& . We then have the 
locus in the appropriate space: 
 ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t g s t
Q t 0
P ' Q t
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− δ − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= =& . (4.11) 
We realize that (4.11) is similar to equation (A1) in Cropper et al. (1979), where 
the planner's objective function was the same as (4.5), except that management was 
considered to be costless, which means that M = 0 in their model. Therefore, we 
conclude that the locus ( )Q t 0=&  is exactly the same, whether M is positive or not. 
Intuitively, a flow of fixed management cost should not influence the harvest level if 
management is chosen. The impact it will have on the solution to the problem is in the 
choice of managing the resource or not. Hence, as M varies, the locus ( )Q t 0=&  will not 
move. Of course, the locus ( )s t 0=&  is the same as in Cropper et al. (1979) as well, 
regardless of M. 
Let us introduce the phase diagrams for this problem under costless resource 




where we have drawn possible loci for ( )Q t 0=&  that are similar to theirs, assuming 
costless management.10 
In Figure 4.2, we have the case where ( )0'g<δ . Thick arrowed lines represent 
the optimal paths under costless management. In this case, it is always best to manage 
the resource, no matter its stock size. This is so because it is assumed that the zero 
average profit line, ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = , is above the optimal paths under 
management along the entire range of feasible stock sizes. From this phase diagram, we 
see that extinction is impossible, so the resource is necessarily conserved in the long 
run. Depending on s0, the steady state stock is either at s*1  or at s*3 . There is also the 
special case where s0 = s*2 , which is the only way to reach and stay at the unstable 
steady state, s*2 . 
                                                 
10 See APPENDIX II for explanations on Figure 4.1 and 4.2, which were analyzed by 




Figure 4.2. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Costless 
Enforcement; ( )0'g<δ . 
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In Figure 4.3, the case where ( )0'g>δ  with costless management is presented. 
The optimal paths under costless management are presented as thick arrowed lines. 
Again, it is always best to manage the resource, no matter its stock size for the same 
reason as in Figure 4.1. In this phase diagram however, extinction is optimal if s0 < s*1 . 
But if s0 > s*1 , then the optimal steady state stock is positive and it is s*3 . In the special 




Figure 4.3. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Costless 
Enforcement, ( )0'g>δ  
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Of interest to us is when management is worth doing at a fixed flow cost of M. 
In Cropper et al. (1979), the resource was worth managing because for all possible s, 
the authors assumed that * 0µ > , which is implicit in the fact that in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
the zero average profit line, ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = , is above the optimal paths under 
management along the entire range of feasible stock sizes. With M > 0 in problem (4.5) 
however, the locus of management regime switch differs from ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = . 





4.4. Social planner's timing problem 
The social planner's problem of choosing between costly management and open 
access is a timing problem since switches can occur across management regimes as the 
resource stock varies. The timing of resource management regime switch(es) is a 
problem that includes the resource management sub-problems in open access (presented 
in section 4.2) and with costly management (problem (4.5) presented in section 4.3). In 
this section, we define the timing problem and we characterize its necessary conditions. 
In order to find the second-best timing of management regime switch(es), we 
therefore assume that the current value Hamiltonian for problem (4.5) is optimized, and 
we denote it as ( )H* t% . Assuming that T0 = 0, the resource planner's timing problem is 
as follows: 
{ }
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
i 1










Max J T ,T H* t e dt














= − − +µ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥




,  (4.12) 
where i = 0, 2, 4, …∞. 
Using Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
that let us peg i 1T + , the time(s) when open access is chosen over costly management, are 
 ( ) ( ) i 1i 1 i 2 rTi 1
i 1
J T ,T










 i 1T 0+ ≥  and 












,   i = 0, 2, 4, …, ∞. (4.13) 
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,   i = 0, ,2, 4, …, ∞. (4.14) 
Note however that in such a case, the resource management problem no longer 
has an infinite horizon. Therefore in that case, the transversality condition (4.10) is 
replaced by the following condition: 
 ( )i 1T 0+µ ≥ , ( ) ( )i 1 i 1T s T 0+ +µ = , Ti+1 < ∞. (4.10') 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions that let us peg i 2T + , the time(s) when costly 
management is chosen over open access, are 
 ( ) ( ) i 2i 1 i 2 rTi 2
i 2
J T ,T










 i 2T 0+ ≥  and 












,   i = 0, ,2, 4, …, ∞. (4.15) 
We can rewrite these conditions in terms of the current value Hamiltonian instead: 
 ( ) ( )i 2i 1 i 2 rT i 2
i 2
J T ,T









 i 2T 0+ ≥  and 
( )











,   i = 0, 2, 4, …, ∞. (4.16) 
First order conditions (4.14) and (4.16) reveal that a switch occurs precisely 
when ( )H* t 0=% . Indeed, the fixed flow cost of management can lead ( )H* t%  to be 
negative even though the open access locus (or zero profit locus) is above the infinite 
horizon solution paths for all feasible s (this is possible only because M is not incurred 





4.5. Steady states with costly resource management 
We already mentioned that for the problem with fixed flow of management cost, 
the loci ( )s t 0=&  and ( )Q t 0=&  are entirely similar to Figures 4.2 and 4.3 (from Cropper 
et al. (1979)). The difference in the phase diagrams lies in whether it is worth managing 
the resource or not, given that M must be paid at each instant for resource management, 
but not in open access. In section 4.4, we found that the condition for a management 
regime switch is ( ) ( ) ( )( )
Q*
0
H* p x dx K s* Q* M * g s* Q* 0= − − +µ − =∫% . Let us 
characterize this locus. We use first order condition (4.7) in the optimized Hamiltonian, 
leading to  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





H Q,s, * P x dx K s Q P Q K s g s Q M
P x dx P Q Q P Q K s g s M
U Q P Q Q P Q K s g s M
µ = − + − − −⎡ ⎤∫ ⎣ ⎦
= − + − −⎡ ⎤∫ ⎣ ⎦
= − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
%
 (4.17) 
Note that with this notation, ( ) ( )U ' Q P Q 0= >  and ( ) ( )U '' Q P ' Q 0= < . 
The following analysis is divided into three cases, depending on whether the 
locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the zero profit line or not.  
 
Assumption 4.1 
The zero profit line is above the growth function for all feasible stock, as in 





Assumption 4.1 holds in all cases considered below. 
The first case is when the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the zero profit line. 
The second case is when ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is below the zero profit line for all feasible s 
(this implies a relatively small M). Finally, the third case is when ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is 
above the zero profit line for all feasible s (this implies a large enough M that 
management is prohibitively costly for all feasible s). 
 
Case 1 : The locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the zero profit line, 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  at stock sπ . 
First consider points where the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the vertical axis, 
where s 0= . At s 0= , the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  implies ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− = : the 
instantaneous consumer surplus generated by costly resource management is equal to 
the instantaneous cost of management, M. Let Qm be the quantity that satisfies 
( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  at s 0= . 
Second, consider the point(s) where the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the zero 
profit line (or open access locus) defined by ( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , or equivalently, with 
no restriction on g(s), ( ) ( ) ( )P Q K s g s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . If an intersection exists, it occurs at 
(Q,s) that satisfies ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * U Q P Q Q P Q K s g s Mµ = − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%  
( ) ( ) ( )P Q K s g s 0= − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , which means that ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− = , the instantaneous 




Figure 4.4 illustrates the open access locus and the CS = M line, as well as the different 
regions defined by them. 
 
Figure 4.4. Regions delimited by the intersection of loci ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
  Q 
               P(Q)-K(s)=0 
  (I) 
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 H* 0<%  
    (II) 
 Qp  
  P(Q)-K(s)>0, U(Q)-P(Q)Q<M 
 
 
     0           s 
From the regions defined in Figure 4.4, the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus must lie in 
regions (I) and (II) exclusively since in the other two regions, ( )H Q,s, * 0µ >%  or 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ <% , unequivocally. 
The slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus is 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
P Q K s g ' s K ' s g sdQ
ds P ' Q Q g sµ =
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
. (4.18) 





( ) ( )
( )
( )P Q K s 0
K ' sdQ
ds P ' Q− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= . (4.19) 
At s 0= , the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
m
H Q,s, * 0 m ms 0
P Q K 0 g ' 0dQ





Let us define Qp as the point where the zero profit line intersects the Q axis. 
Since Qm is above Qp, then at s 0= , ( ) ( )mP Q K 0 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , and the slope of 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is positive. If Qm were below Qp, then at s 0= , we would find 
( ) ( )mP Q K 0 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , and thus the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  would be negative. If Qm = 
Qp then at s 0= , we would have ( ) ( )mP Q K 0 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , and the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  
would be  zero. In Case 1, where the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the zero profit line 
intersect, Qm > Qp and therefore, the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  at s 0=  is positive. 
If the zero profit line intersects the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus at s s 0π= > , the slope 
of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus at that intersection is 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )




H Q,s, * 0
P Q K s 0
0, if Q g s
K ' sdQ 0, if Q g s
ds Q ,if Q g s .P ' Q 1
g s
µ =
− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
> <⎧
⎪= < >⎨




(This is also the slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus where g'(s)=0) 
Under Assumption 4.1, the slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus is negative at its 




( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% , we conclude that there must be a stock in the interval 0 < s < sπ  where 
the slope of the locus is zero. From (4.18), this implies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P Q K s g ' s K ' s g s− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . The right hand side of that equation is negative and 
since in the interval 0 < s < sπ  the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is above the zero profit line, 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Therefore ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  has a zero slope at some s such that 
g'(s)>0, or in the interval 0 < s < sMSY, where sMSY is the resource stock that allows the 
maximum sustainable yield (g'(sMSY)=0). 
If the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus intersects the growth function, then where this 
happens Q = g(s) and we can rewrite (4.17) as ( )( )H g s ,s, * 0µ =%  as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )U g s K s g s M 0− − = : the instantaneous total economic surplus of harvesting is 
equal to the flow fixed cost of management. The slope of ( )( )H g s ,s, * 0µ =%  is infinite: 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H* 0
Q g s
P Q K s g ' s K ' s g sdQ
ds P ' Q Q g s




− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= = ∞
%
  (4.21) 
If the intersection is at a stock smaller or equal to the maximum sustainable 
yield, g'(s)≥0, and from (4.18), the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is negative above the 
growth function and positive below it. 
Alternatively, if the intersection between ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the growth 
function occurs at a stock greater than the maximum sustainable yield, g'(s)<0. From 




function and negative below it. Since at the intersection between ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and 
the zero profit line the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is negative, the alternative case implies 
that the slope is infinite somewhere above the growth function. However, from (4.18), 
we see that the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is infinite only as it crosses the growth 
function. The alternative case where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  crosses the growth function at a 
stock greater than the maximum sustainable yield (where g'(s)<0) is impossible. 
Let us now characterize the slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus where it intersects 
the Q 0=&  isocline. As shown in (4.11), Q 0=&  satisfies 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t g s t 0⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− δ − + =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , or 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t g s t P Q t K s t 0⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − = δ − >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
because ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0⎡ ⎤− = µ >⎣ ⎦  by Assumption 4.1. Since the slope of the 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus is 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
P Q K s g ' s K ' s g sdQ
ds P ' Q Q g sµ =
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
, at an 
intersection with Q 0=& , the numerator of the slope is positive. Hence, at Q 0=& , 





 if ( )Q g s 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and 





 if ( )Q g s 0− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . This 
means that at an intersection with Q 0=& , the slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus is 
positive if it occurs below the growth function; it is negative if the intersection occurs 




For the Case 1, where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the zero profit line intersect, we have 
characterized the shape of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus. We must now prove the existence 
of cases where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the growth function. 
 
Assumption 4.2 
( ) ( )P 0 K s 0− >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  for all feasible s. 
 
We found that at s 0= , ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  implies ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− = , which is 
illustrated at point (Qm,0) in Figure 4.4. Under Assumption 4.1., if the locus 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the zero profit line intersect at sπ , then the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  
is positive at s 0=  and negative at s sπ= . That slope is then infinite when 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the growth function below the maximum sustainable yield, 
and it is positive below the growth function. Given the continuity of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% , 
the locus must either intersect the vertical axis again or it must intersect the horizontal 
axis. The only Q for which ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  at s 0=  is Qm. If the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  
went back to it from below, it would have to pass through the region in Figure 4.4 
where H* 0<% . Therefore this is not possible and ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  must instead reach the 
horizontal axis where Q=0. 
Consider points where the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the horizontal axis. 




and since M > 0, if ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the horizontal axis, it must do so at some 
stock sh > 0. The slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  at Q=0 is 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
Q 0
P 0 K s g ' s K ' s g sdQ 0
ds P ' 0 g sµ =
=
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= >
−%
 since it occurs on the left of the 
maximum sustainable yield. Therefore in Case 1, as long as Assumption 4.2 holds, 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the horizontal axis. 
 
Proposition 4.1 
In Case 1, where the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the zero profit line 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  at stock sπ >0, under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, the locus 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the growth function. 
Proof 
As demonstration above, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is defined at (Qm,0), (Qm, 
sπ ) and at (0,sh). By continuity, this implies that ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  must cross the growth 
function.  
 
(Examples of Case 1 are illustrated in Figures 4.5.A-C and 4.6.A-B.) 
Let us now characterize how the consumer surplus line, ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− = , 
and locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  move on the phase diagram as M increases. First note that if 
M = 0, then ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  is verified at Qm = 0. This is the case for the Cropper 










dM P ' Q Q
−
= > . Since the open access locus (or zero profit line) is 
invariant with M, if M is large enough, ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  intersects it, as is assumed 
in Case 1. If M is relatively small however, Qm < Qp and ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  is below 
the open access locus for all feasible s; this is depicted in Case 2 below. If M is 
relatively large, then ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  is above the open access locus for all 
feasible s; this is Case 3 below. 
In Case 1, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the vertical axis at Qm, the 
horizontal axis at sh, and the open access locus at sπ . How does ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  vary as 
M increases? From (4.17), we find 
( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
dQ 1
dM P ' Q g s Qµ =
=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
. Therefore, as M 
increases, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  above the growth function moves up on the phase 
diagram, and it moves down below the growth function. From (4.17) we also find 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
ds 1
dM P Q K s g ' s K ' s g sµ =
=
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
. Hence, for stocks below the 
maximum sustainable yield and quantities on or below the open access locus, 










dM P ' Q Q
−
= >  found above. Thus 
as M increases, the area where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ <%  increases (this is delimited by the 




In summary, in Case 1, where the zero profit locus and the surplus line (CS=M) 
cross at s = sπ > 0, in (Q,s)-space, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  starts at (Qm,0) and has a 
positive slope. It reaches a maximum in Q, and then slopes downward, more and more. 
It crosses both the zero profit locus and the surplus line at (Qm,sπ). It then crosses the 
growth function ( s 0=&  locus) with an infinite slope. Under the growth function, it has a 
negative slope and ultimately reaches the horizontal axis at (0,sh). The locus 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  crosses the growth function at the maximum sustainable yield or at a 
smaller stock, i.e., at a stock such that ( )g ' s 0≥ . 
Given the characterization of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  for Case 1, let us now analyze 
long term equilibria for the phase diagrams introduced in Cropper et al. (1979). In a 
similar but more general model, Lewis and Schmalensee (1977) showed that a 
necessary condition for not following the infinite horizon optimal path is that the steady 
state that would be realized starting at initial stock s0 lead to a negative steady state 
Hamiltonian.11 In section 4.4, we found the necessary condition ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  for the 
locus that delimits the stock range where the infinite horizon optimal path (costly 
management) and open access are chosen. These conditions will be instrumental to the 
following phase diagram analysis. 
                                                 
11 See Proposition 10 on page 546. In their article, Lewis and Schmalensee assume a 
fixed flow of harvest cost and no open access harvest. Hence in their model, if the fixed 





Figures 4.5A-C relate to Cropper et al.'s case where ( )g ' 0δ < , while Figures 
4.6B-C relate to Cropper et al.'s case where ( )g ' 0δ > . In all these figures, sc is the 
critical stock below which the initial stock, s0, leads to a path other than the infinite 
horizon optimal path in the costly management problem and ultimately, to extinction. 
In Figure 4.5.A, the fixed flow cost of management, M=MA, is smaller than in 
Figure 4.5.B where M=MB. Figure 4.5.C has the highest cost of all three figures, 
M=MC. Hence MA<MB<MC. This is illustrated by the surplus line moving up, sπ 
moving right and the area where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ <%  increasing from Figure 4.5.A to 4.5.B 




Figure 4.5.A. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement; ( )0'g<δ . 
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In Figure 4.5.A, since MA is relatively small, the intersection between 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the infinite horizon optimal path (sfoc) is at a rather low stock. Since 
at that intersection, s 0>&  on the optimal path, sc=sfoc: the critical initial stock under 
which the infinite horizon optimal path is sub-optimal is sfoc. For stocks such that 
foc 0s s s≤ ≤ , the infinite horizon optimal path is followed as if M=0. This is because at 
such higher stocks where harvest cost is smaller and harvest is greater, management 
cost is worth incurring. If s0 < sfoc, there is costly management and harvest until (Qm,sπ) 
is reached, after which open access prevails until extinction occurs. One possible path is 




stocks must follow first order conditions (4.7)-(4.10). Specifically in finite horizon, 
(4.10) implies that when costly management is no longer incurred, since s(T)>0 at sπ, 
then we must have µ(T)=0: the resource manager's finite horizon path must reach the 
zero profit line, as depicted above. The second best optimal path illustrated between sfoc 
and sπ leads to ( )H Q,s, * 0µ >%  for that range of resource stock. There are several paths 
that reach the zero profit line, but the most inter-temporal welfare inducing one is 
chosen. From section 4.4, we know that a switch in management regime will occur at 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and transversality condition (4.10) tells us that the management path 
must reach the zero profit line. Hence, the end of the costly management regime must 
occur at (Qm,sπ). The exact shape of the path is unknown; it could be upward-sloping, 
downward-sloping or it could even be non-monotonic in Q. What we know for sure is 
that it starts at sfoc and ends at (Qm,sπ).  




Figure 4.5.B. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement; ( )g ' 0δ < . 
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In Figure 4.5.B, the flow of fixed management cost, MB is greater than MA in 
Figure 4.5.A. Here the intersection between ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the infinite horizon 
optimal path (sfoc) is at a stock greater than *1s , the lowest stable steady state in the 
phase diagram. The intersection occurs where s 0<&  on the optimal path, and therefore, 
sc= *2s  : the critical initial stock under which the infinite horizon optimal path is sub-




For small initial stocks, i.e., s0< *2s , the second best optimal finite horizon 
management path is chosen between *2s  and (Qm, sπ ), for which ( )H Q,s, * 0µ >% . Once 
(Qm, sπ ) is reached, no management occurs and open access prevails until extinction 
occurs. The finite horizon path between *2s  and (Qm, sπ ) must follow first order 
conditions (4.7)-(4.10) and the necessary condition ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  when there is a 
switch from costly management to open access exploitation. Similarly to Figure 4.5.A, 
the exact shape of that path depends on the parameters of the problem and cannot be 
known in this general model. 
If 0s sπ≤ , then we immediately have open access until extinction is reached. If 
*
0 2s s≥ , the infinite horizon optimal path is followed as if M=0. As in Figure 4.5.A, this 
is because at such higher stocks where harvest cost is smaller and harvest is greater, 
management is worth paying for. 
In Figure 4.5.C, the fixed flow of management cost, MC, is even greater than in 
Figure 4.5.B. As in Figure 4.5.A, the intersection between ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and the 
infinite horizon optimal path (sfoc) occurs where s 0>&  on the optimal path. Hence, 
sc=sfoc: the critical initial stock under which the infinite horizon optimal path is sub-
optimal is sfoc. For stocks such that foc 0s s s≤ ≤ , the infinite horizon optimal path is 
followed as if M=0. However, for smaller initial stocks, s0<sfoc, open access exploitation 
will eventually prevail, which will lead to extinction. If 0s sπ≤ , we immediately have 
open access until extinction is reached. If however 0 focs s sπ < < , then the path between 




conditions (4.7)-(4.10) as well as the necessary condition for a management regime 
switch: ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% . As before, the shape of the finite horizon path between sfoc and 
(Qm,sπ) could vary depending on the parameters of the problem. One possible path is 
illustrated on Figure 4.5.C between sfoc and sπ.  
As we go from Figure 4.5.A to B to C, we note that as the fixed flow cost of 
management increases, the interval for s0 that leads to optimal infinite horizon paths 
contracts. 
 
Figure 4.5.C. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement; ( )0'g<δ . 
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In Figures 4.5.A-C, we assumed that ( )g ' 0δ < : the discount rate is small 
compared to the marginal biological growth close to extinction. In Cropper et al. (1979) 
extinction was never optimal in that case (see Figure 4.2). However, when the resource 
manager must pay a fixed flow of management cost M, despite the fact that ( )g ' 0δ < , 
there exists a critical stock sc, under which the second best optimal management will 
lead to extinction. This is what happens if s0<sc. 
In the next two figures (4.6.A-B), we assume that ( )g ' 0δ > : the discount rate is 
large compared to the marginal biological growth close to extinction. In that case, as 
shown by Cropper et al. (1979), at relatively small initial stocks, extinction is optimal 




Figure 4.6.A. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement, ( )0'g>δ  
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In Figure 4.6.A, the critical stock leading to extinction, sc, is *1s , the same as if 
M=0. Indeed in the case where ( )g ' 0δ > , extinction is first best optimal for *0 1s s< . 
Here however, if *0 1s s< , then a second best optimal path is chosen because of the area 
where ( )H Q,s, * 0µ <% . A second best optimal path between *1s  and (Qm, sπ ) is chosen 
so that ( )H Q,s, * 0µ >% . Then open access management prevails until extinction is 




sloping and it can even be non-monotonic in Q, as long as it follows necessary 
conditions (4.7)-(4.10) and ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  when costly management is abandoned for 
open access exploitation. If s0<sπ , then open access exploitation happens immediately 
until extinction of the resource is reached. For *0 1s s≥ , the infinite horizon optimal path 
is followed towards *2s  as if M=0.  
 
Figure 4.6.B. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement, ( )0'g>δ  
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In Figure 4.6.B, the fixed flow of management cost, MBB, is greater than MAA in 




horizon path cross where s 0>& , then the critical stock, sc, is equal to sfoc. For stocks 
such that foc 0s s s≤ ≤ , the infinite horizon optimal path is followed as if M=0. At such 
larger stocks, per-unit harvest cost is smaller and instantaneous harvest is greater, which 
leads to management cost being worth incurring. 
However, for smaller initial stocks, s0<sfoc, open access exploitation will 
eventually prevail, which will lead to extinction. If 0s sπ≤ , then we immediately have 
open access until extinction is reached. If 0 focs s sπ < < , then the path between sfoc and 
(Qm,sπ) is in finite horizon and must respect first order and transversality conditions 
(4.7)-(4.10) as well as the necessary condition for a management regime switch: 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% . As before, the shape of the finite horizon path between sfoc and (Qm,sπ) 
could vary depending on the parameters of the problem. One possible path is illustrated 
on Figure 4.6.B between sfoc and (Qm,sπ).  
Going from Figure 4.6.A to Figure 4.6.B, we note once more that as the fixed 
flow cost of management increases, the interval for s0 that leads to the optimal infinite 
horizon path contracts. 
We now present Case 2. 
Case 2: The surplus line ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  lies below the zero profit locus, 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  
Consequently, Qm is below zero profit line, and ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  does not 
intersect the zero profit line. Let us illustrate the regions delimited by 




Figure 4.7. Regions delimited by U(Q)-P(Q)Q=M, ( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% when Qm < Qp. 
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In this case, a locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  can only be found in region (III). Indeed, 
above the zero profit line H* 0<%  and between the zero profit line and the locus 
( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− = , H* 0>% . We illustrate an example of locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  in 
Figure 4.7 for Case 2. The locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  has the following characteristics: from 
equation (4.20), it has a negative slope at (Qm, s 0= ), it has an infinite slope where it 
crosses the growth function and it crosses the horizontal axis at some sh > 0. Also, if it 
crosses the Q 0=&  locus, its slope is positive if the intersection below the growth 
function; it is negative if the intersection occurs above the growth function. 
The same exercise can be done with Case 2 as we did in Case 1 in Figures 




paths, the characteristics of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus are the same as in Case 1. Results 
are therefore similar to those explained above, except that for smaller stocks, extinction 
can be reached under costly management. This is because in Case 2, the area where 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ <%  does not encompass any part of the zero profit (or open access 
management) locus. Costly management leading to extinction thus respects finite 
horizon transversality condition (4.10) since this implies that µ(T)>0 but s(T)=0 and 
hence µ(T)s(T)=0. 
As in Case 1, the surplus line moves up as the fixed flow of management cost 
increases, and consequently, the area for which ( )H Q,s, * 0µ <%  increases. As we found 
before, the critical stock, sc, increases as M increases, i.e., the interval of initial stocks 
for which second best optimal management leads to extinction increases as M increases. 
Also, as in Case 1, even when ( )g ' 0δ < ,12 for a high enough fixed flow of management 
cost, M, and a small enough initial stock s0, extinction can be second best optimal even 
though it would never be first best optimal, i.e., never optimal under M=0. 
In Cropper et al.(1979), M=0, which in our analysis means that 
( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  lies on the horizontal axis. Therefore H* 0>%  everywhere between 
the zero profit line and the horizontal axis and the infinite horizon optimal path is 
followed. In Case 2, as in Case 1, as M increases, Qm increases and the 
                                                 
12 The discount rate is small compared to the marginal biological growth close to 




( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =  locus moves up on the phase diagram: ( )
dQ 1 0
dM P ' Q Q
−
= > . Also, 
as M increases, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  moves as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
dQ 1
dM P ' Q g s Qµ =
=
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
. Therefore, as M increases, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  
above the growth function moves up on the phase diagram, and it moves down below 
the growth function. Also, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * 0
ds 1
dM P Q K s g ' s K ' s g sµ =
=
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦%
. Hence, 
for stocks below the maximum sustainable yield and quantities on or below the open 
access locus, 










dM P ' Q Q
−
= >  found 
above.  
The change in the area delimited by ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  leads to the fact that as M 
increases, the stocks at which ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  intersects the growth function as well as 
the infinite horizon path increase. If M is large enough, we have the polar case where 
open access is preferred for all feasible stocks and extinction occurs no matter what s0 
may be; see Case 3 below and Figures 4.8-4.10. 
 
Case 3: The surplus line ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  lies above the zero profit locus, 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , for all feasible stocks. 
This implies that Qm is above Qp. As a consequence, the locus ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  




( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , and ( ) ( )U Q P Q Q M− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  when Qm > Qp and the loci do not 
cross. 
 
Figure 4.8. Regions delimited by the intersection of loci ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  and 
( ) ( )P Q K s 0− =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  with Qm>Qp and the lines do not cross. 
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 Qp      U(Q)-P(Q)Q<M 
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In Figure 4.8, there are two regions where we could have ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% : 
regions (IV) and (V). However, we must rule out region (V) because at s 0= , 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  holds at Qm only and at that point, the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is 
positive. In addition, at s s= , since ( )g s 0=  we find 
( ) ( ) ( )H Q,s, * U Q P Q Q M 0µ = − − =%  (from equation 4.17), so ( )mH Q , s, * 0µ =% . Also 
at s s= , the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is negative since ( )g s 0= , ( ) ( )mP Q K 0 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  




profit line do not intersect implies that ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  does not intersect the line U(Q)-
P(Q)Q=M and therefore, ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  is above the line U(Q)-P(Q)Q=M for all 
feasible s. This is consistent with H* 0<%  below Qm. Since the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus 
does not reach Q<Qm, we must rule out region (V) for ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =% . 
 
Proposition 4.2 
In Case 3, any initial stock s0 will lead to extinction. Management problem 
(4.12) is a finite horizon problem with Ti+1=0, which means that open access is chosen 
from the beginning until the resource stock is extinct. 
 
Let us characterize the slope of ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  for 0 s s< <  (not necessary to 
know which path is chosen however). The slope of the ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  locus is given 
by equation (4.18). First, at the maximum sustainable yield stock, ( )MSYg ' s 0= , which 
implies a negative slope: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
MSY
H Q,s, * 0
s s
K ' s g sdQ 0





. Second, for 
MSY0 s s< < , we have ( )g ' s 0>  and ( )g s 0> , meaning that the slope of 
( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  could be positive or negative. Third, for MSYs s s< < , we have 
( )g ' s 0<  and ( )g s 0> , which implies that ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  has a negative slope. 
Finally from (4.18), ( )H Q,s, * 0µ =%  has a zero slope where 




or s such that MSY0 s s< <  because ( ) ( )P Q K s 0− <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . We illustrate possible cases in 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement; ( )0'g<δ . 
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0       s~ ŝ   *1s       
*
2s       sm      
*
3s     s  s 
 
In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, the fixed flow of management cost is so high that open 
access is the second best optimal management regime for all feasible resource stocks. 





Figure 4.10. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Fixed 
Flow Cost of Enforcement, ( )0'g>δ  
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In this chapter, a fixed flow of management cost, M, was added to Cropper et 
al.'s 1979 model of optimal resource management.  
Since the flow of management cost is fixed, if the infinite horizon trajectory is 
second best optimal, it is the exact same as the first best optimal trajectory. However, 
for some resource stocks, the first best optimal path may not be second best optimal. In 




exploited in open access to extinction for any feasible initial resource stock. For smaller 
M, the first best optimal path is not second best optimal for smaller resource stocks 
only. In those cases, a finite horizon second best optimal costly management path can 
be chosen that leads to positive returns until resource management switches to open 
access leading to extinction (Case 1) or costly management can be second best optimal 
until extinction occurs (Case 2). Either way, a second best finite horizon path decreases 
the resource stock and extinction is the ultimate outcome.  
The greater the fixed flow of management cost, the greater is the area (and the 
greater is the interval of initial stock, s0) for which the first best optimal trajectory is not 
second best. Even in cases where ( )g ' 0δ < , i.e., the discount rate is small compared to 
the marginal biological growth close to extinction, extinction can be the best option for 





CHAPTER 5. TRADE MODEL WITH COSTLY RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
5.1. Introduction 
International trade is welfare increasing in the simplest theoretical models, but it 
may not always be so in reality. Over the past decade, popular beliefs against free trade 
have developed such that nowadays, anti-globalization demonstrations often make 
headline news. For example, in Seattle in 1999, anti-globalization protestors were 
effective in getting media attention and even in disrupting high-level international 
meetings dealing, among other things, with international trade. Anti-globalization 
activists fear that free trade may not be good for the environment, for different labor 
interests and for the economic welfare of the poorest (Powell and White, 2002; Colitt, 
2002). Some fear a generalized "race to the bottom," towards a world where national 
regulations would disappear due to global competition, and therefore, where the quality 
of life would be overall diminished. Members of academia are part of the debate as 
well. For example, in 1993, economists Bhagwati and Daly presented arguments for and 
against free trade in the popular magazine Scientific American. 
Contrary to anti-globalization groups' contentions, economists Dollar and Kraay 
(2002) have shown that freer trade in the past has decreased the economic inequality 
between the richest and poorest, both across and within nations. However, these authors 
insist on the importance of changing institutions and policies along with increased 
international integration in order for the economic growth to benefit the entire economy. 




Anti-globalization groups also tend to think that trade is detrimental to the 
environment. Many economists believe that freer trade can help protect the 
environment. Their point of view is that, if trade promotes economic development, and 
if the environmental Kuznets' curve (EKC) hypothesis turns out to be true, then free 
trade would necessarily promote a better environment, at least in the long run. However, 
the economic incentives through which the EKC could occur are little known so far, and 
so more theoretical and empirical work is needed to study trade with negative 
externalities or natural resource issues. No clear-cut theoretical result exists, so we 
cannot say if trade is altogether good or bad for the environment. From what we know, 
trade is likely good for the environment and the conservation of natural resources in 
some cases, and bad in others. What characterizes each case is the question. 
Not surprisingly, anti-globalization groups are not keen on the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), whose political mandate is to promote international free trade. In 
recent years however, the WTO and other international institutions have publicly 
discussed environmental and social issues more than ever before. In 1994, the 
Marrakhesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO's 
founding charter) was signed following the Uruguay Round, and its preamble refers to 
the importance of sustainable development, including the protection of the environment 
(WTO, 2002c). With this Agreement, the WTO was created (formerly "GATT 
members"), as well as, namely, the Committee on Environment and Trade (CET), 
whose mandate is to study the impact of international trade on the environment. The 
WTO has been interested in environmental policies for a long time. Historically 




Indeed, the 1971 GATT study entitled "Industrial Pollution Control and International 
Trade" was more concerned about the impact of environmental policy on free trade than 
the potential opposite effect (WTO, 2002b). Now however, through the CET, the WTO 
does discuss free trade potentially hindering the environment. 
Chapter 5 provides a partial answer to the contemporary debate over free trade 
of a renewable resource. An important finding is that resource management institutions 
(or management regimes), are crucial to our results about welfare changes following a 
move from autarky to free trade. Hence we concur with Dollar and Kraay (2002) on the 
fact that institutions matter a great deal in the process towards free trade. 
The objectives of this chapter are 
i. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under open access exploitation of the 
resource; 
ii. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under costless management of the resource, 
i.e., under the first best policy; 
iii. characterize the impact of free trade on social welfare and on the 
conservation of the resource under costly management of the resource, 
i.e., under a second best policy; 
iv. characterize the cases where the resource management regime could 
change due to free trade following autarky (open access versus costly 




v. characterize the cases where the move from autarky to free trade can be 
welfare decreasing, and by extension, where some level of barrier to 
trade would be better; and finally, 
vi. characterize the cases where the move from autarky to free trade can 
cause the extinction of the renewable resource. 
 
We address these objectives through a trade model with a renewable resource 
input. In the next section, we introduce the general assumptions underlying all the 
models in this chapter. In section 5.3 to 5.6, a model is analyzed under different 
resource management regimes. Potential welfare and conservation impacts of moving 
from autarky to free trade are characterized for each management regime. In section 5.3, 
we assume an open access management regime for the resource sector, which is the 
worst-case scenario in terms of discounted inter-temporal welfare maximization. In 
section 5.4, we analyze the first best scenario, that is, the textbook costless resource 
management and welfare benchmark. In section 5.5 we analyze the second best model 
of resource management with a fixed cost of management. In section 5.6 we analyze 
empirically relevant resource management regimes and potential switches. In section 
5.7, we discuss the policy implications of our results. We then conclude. 
 
5.2. General assumptions about the home country 
The trade model includes two final goods, a resource good, H(t), and a 




s(t), and labor, L, the supply of which is assumed to be constant. The manufactures 
sector also uses a specific factor, K . 
In the sections that follow, we analyze welfare and conservation issues of the 
home country, which we assume is a small country. For the home country, A as a 
superscript stands for equilibrium values in autarky and T as a subscript for free trade 
equilibrium values; a subscript ∞ indicates long-run equilibrium as opposed to a 
transitory path equilibrium. Under different resource management regimes, we 
characterize short run and long run general equilibria in autarky and, in free trade, 
under small country assumptions, i.e., taking world relative prices as given. The 
discount rate, δ, is given and constant in time; it represents individual's inter-temporal 
preferences. We assume that 0 < δ < ∞, which represents some level of impatience for 
consumption since δ > 0, but also some care for future utility, since δ < ∞. We do not 
allow for saving and borrowing, so the economy's budget must be balanced at each 
point in time. 
5.2.1. Endowment 
The home country is endowed with total fixed labor, L. For simplicity and 
without loss of generality, we normalize total labor to one unit per individual, for a total 
of L individuals in the economy. Furthermore, the home country is endowed with K  
fixed units of a specific factor. 
The home country is endowed with a renewable resource with stock s(t), which 
can vary over time. We denote the initial resource stock as s0. The resource growth 




g''(s(t)) < 0 for all s such that ( )0 s t s≤ ≤ , where s  is the wildlife population's natural 
carrying capacity and s(t) = 0 implies the irreversible extinction of the stock considered. 
The rate of change of the resource stock, when there is no harvest, is written as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ds t s t g s t
dt
= =& . 
We note that even if a resource stock is unique in the world, an endemic species 
for example, or a rarified species dwindling on the brink of extinction, then an 
exogenous world price exists that represents the price of a substitute to the resource 
good. A famous example is rhinoceros horn powder, which is used in traditional Asian 
medicine, and which can be substituted by, among other medicines, the much cheaper 
and more effective aspirin for its proven anti-fever effect (Brower, 1994, p.124). 
Therefore, our analysis can be applied to an endangered specie found only in the home 
country, as long as some substitute exists for it on the world market. Our analysis also 
applies to other renewable resources that exist in the rest of the world as well as in the 
home country. In such cases, the world relative price applies to the exact same goods as 
the ones produced in the home country. 
5.2.2. Production 
A P-superscript refers to production, a cursive variable is for individual firms, 
and variables in capital letters represent aggregate quantities. Two goods are produced: 
a resource-based good ( )( )P H tH L , and a manufactured good, MP(LM(t)), which we 
assume is produced with labor and capital. The production function ( )( )P M t , KLγ  is 
characterized by constant returns to scale and a diminishing marginal rate of 




economy. Therefore, capital, being a fixed factor in manufacturing, can be normalized 
to 1, so that ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P P PM M Mt ,K t ,1 tL L M L= =γ γ  where ( )( )P M' t 0M L >  and 
( )( )P M'' t 0M L < . The net gain that arises from the concavity of MP is the fixed factor 
rent. 
In this chapter, we assume that productivity in the resource good depends only 
on labor, as long as the resource stock is positive: if s(t) > 0, then ( )( )P HH tL =  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )P Ph hH N t t N t h t=l l , where ( )( )P h th l  is an individual firm's output, and 
N(t) is the number of harvesting firms. We assume that ( )( )P h t 0h =l  if 
( ) minh h0 t≤ ≤l l  and that ( )( )P h t 0h >l  if ( ) minh ht >l l . This means that there is a 
minimum labor requirement for a firm's harvest to be positive: 
( ) ( )( ){ }min Ph h hmin t : t 0 0h= > >l l l ; this is the production function equivalent of a 
fixed cost of harvest. For ( ) minh ht >l l , we assume a strictly concave production 
function, that is, ( )( )P h' t 0h >l , ( )( )P h'' t 0h <l . See Figure 5.1 for clarification. 
 
Figure 5.1. Assumptions on individual firms' harvest production function 
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We note that there is no dependence of the harvest production function on the 
resource stock, and that the only input paid for is labor, with wage rate ( )tω . Therefore, 
in this model, instantaneous net gains do not depend on the resource stock. This means 
that the resource stock can only have inter-temporal value, depending on the discount 
rate, when the future is taken into account in an objective function. 
The renewable resource stock is affected by harvesting as depicted by the stock 
transition equation: ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P Hs t g s t H tL= −& . 
5.2.3. Numéraire good 
The manufactured good is the numéraire: ( )M Mp t p 1= = , for all t, and the 





= = , where pH(t) is the resource good price relative to 
the manufactured good price. 
5.2.4. Consumption 
A C-superscript refers to consumption; a lowercase variable is for individuals, 
while capital letters are reserved for aggregate quantities. We assume that individual 
preferences can be represented by a neoclassical utility function ( ) ( )( )C Cu h t ,m t , 
which is homothetic. A homothetic utility function is a special case of the Gorman form 
utility function, which implies that an individual's utility function is representative of 




count equally in the social welfare function.13 This way, social welfare depends on 
GDP, irrespective of distributional issues. We will thus be able to infer aggregate 
consumption easily, as well as aggregate welfare. 
Aggregate income is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P PY t p t H t M t= + . Since utility is homothetic for 
all individuals in the economy, we can write individual i's consumption of the resource 
good as h(t) = hC(p(t))yi(t) and the aggregate consumption as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
L LC C C C
i i
i 1 i 1
H t h p t y t h p t y t h p t Y t
= =
= = =∑ ∑ . In the same manner, 
individual i's consumption of the manufactured good is m(t) = mC(p(t))yi(t), and its 
aggregate consumption is ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
L LC C C
i i
i 1 i 1
M t m p t y t m p t y t
= =
= =∑ ∑  
( )( ) ( )Cm p t Y t= .14 A homothetic utility function also implies that the indirect utility 
function takes the form ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )v p t , Y t p t Y t= ν , such that v1 < 0, v11 > 0, v2 > 0, 
v22 = 0 and v12 < 0. This will be helpful in analyzing welfare changes. 
Furthermore, we assume an interior solution to the consumer problem, whenever 
production and trade allow for it. This means that, at any point in time, if it is 
impossible to consume both goods (in autarky, because of the extinction of the 
renewable resource, for example), then individuals are worse off than they would have 
been if they could have consumed some of the resource good. Therefore, if it is possible 
                                                 
13 For details, see Varian (1992), p.152-154. 
14 Homothetic utility functions can be written as linearly homogeneous in income 




to consume some of both goods, then that will always be the chosen over corner 
solutions. 
 
5.3. Open access: complete rent dissipation 
If property rights over the renewable resource are not defined or not effective, 
then exploitation occurs in open access. Profit maximizing harvesters, who hire labor, 
enter the resource sector until their respective profit is equal to zero, which means that 
all resource rents are dissipated. The intuition behind this is that if one does not exhaust 
all the rents he can extract at any point in time, then someone else will. Thus aggregate 
and individual harvesting behavior does not take the future into account. 
5.3.1. Production of the resource good 
Each harvesting firm takes the resource price and the wage rate as given, and it 
hires labor to maximize its profit. The objective is: 
 
( )




p t h t t tMax ⎡ ⎤−ω⎣ ⎦
l
l l  (5.1) 
Assuming harvesting takes place, the first order condition is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )hp t h ' t t 0−ω =l . (5.2) 
Under perfect competition between harvesting firms, entry occurs until profit 
opportunities are dissipated: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
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h
























 = constant. (5.4) 
Hence, from (5.2) and (5.4), when the resource good is produced in the economy, it 







= % , (5.5) 
which is a constant ratio. 
Let us write the unique corresponding level of hired labor per firm as 





t : h ' t h
t
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= = =⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
l %% l ll
l
. Aggregate harvest is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P P P PH h h hH t H t H N t N t h N t hL= = = = %% % %l l l . Since h~  and h%l  are 
constant, it is through the number of firms, N(t), that the production equilibrium occurs. 
We assume that entry is such that (5.3) occurs instantaneously. 
5.3.2. Production of the manufactured good 
As stated in section 5.2.2. the manufacturing sector has decreasing marginal 
returns, and it takes the resource price and the wage rate as given. Labor is hired to 
maximize aggregate profits: 
 
( )




M t t tMax L L⎡ ⎤−ω⎣ ⎦  (5.6) 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is 




Using this first order condition and the results from the resource sector, we 
obtain that in general equilibrium, if both goods are produced, then the marginal value 
product of labor in both sectors is equated to the wage rate: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )MM ' L t p t h t= = ω% . (5.8) 
5.3.3. Consumption 
A representative individual maximizes his utility under his budget constraint: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }C C C C C Cih t ,m tMax u h t ,m t t y t p t h t m t+ λ − − . (5.9) 
First order conditions lead to the equilibrium price being 








= . (5.10) 
As stated before, since individuals all have the same preferences, aggregate demands 
are as follows: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )C CH t h p t Y t=  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )C CM t m p t Y t=  (5.11) 
5.3.4. Walrasian equilibrium 
The necessary condition of consumption problem (5.9) determines the relative 
price of the resource good, ( )p t as specified in (5.10). Since h%  is constant and ( )p t  is 
given by the consumption equilibrium, the necessary and entry conditions on production 
of the resource good leading to (5.5) peg the wage rate, ( ) ( )t p t hω = % . The necessary 
condition on production of the manufactured good (5.7) then determines the division of 
labor across production sectors. The conditions for this general equilibrium do not 




long as the resource stock is positive. Hence the harvest level does not change as long 
as the resource stock is positive. 
At all times t, the labor and budget constraints of the home country translate 
into: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
H M
h M
L L t L t




 and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P PY t p t H t M t= +  (5.13) 
5.3.5. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
By assumption, as long as the resource is not extinct, then both goods are 
produced and consumed in autarky. The economy's instantaneous Walrasian 
equilibrium requires that production and consumption of the resource good be equal: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )C C P H hp t ,Y t h p t Y t L t ;s t 0 N t hΗ = = Η > = % %l . (5.14) 
So when the resource good is produced in open access, we find that 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
C
h






Hence, the number of harvesting firms, N, is a function of p, which in general 








= . It is 
also a function of income, Y(t), which is determined by the parameters of the economy 
such as individual preferences, harvest and manufacturing technology, resource stock 
and quantity of labor. N(t) is also directly a function of the harvest technology through 




Given that instantaneous net gains are not affected by the resource stock, and 
given that in open access, the change of the resource stock is not taken into account in 
the harvesters' optimization problem, then N(t) = N; it is fixed over time. Hence, as long 
as the resource stock is positive, the aggregate harvest and harvest labor also are fixed. 
Assuming preferences do not change over time, this implies that prices are also 
constant. 
In autarky, supply and demand of the manufactured good must also be equal: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )C C P PM hM p t ,Y t m p t Y t M L t M L N t .= = = − %l  (5.16) 
Since harvest labor is fixed over time, given the total labor constraint, then the resource 
good and the manufactures are produced and consumed in fixed quantities over time, 
until a steady state stock is reached. Assuming that the initial resource stock is the 
natural carrying capacity, s0 = s , then conservation occurs as long as the equilibrium 
harvest is no greater than the biological growth at the maximum sustainable yield stock 
level, sMSY, as defined in Definition 3.1: 
 given that s0 = s , As∞ > 0 iff ( ) ( )P H MSYH L g s≤ . (5.17) 
If ( ) ( )P H MSYH L g s< , the optimal steady state is stable. In contrast, if 
( ) ( )P H MSYH L g s= , then the optimal steady state is the MSY, and it is unstable. 
If ( ) ( )P H MSYH L g s> , then extinction occurs in finite time. Given that an 
interior solution is optimal in the consumption of both goods, then, in autarky, 
individuals are worse off after extinction occurs. 
In the case where the initial resource stock is smaller than the natural carrying 




To show this, let us define the unique resource stock 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }Pmin Hmin s t : H L g s ts = =  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }P Hs t : H L g s t ,g ' s t 0= = ≥ , i.e., 
smin is the unique lower, unstable, steady state stock, out of one or two possible steady 
states. There is one possible steady state if smin = sMSY; there are two otherwise. Then 
under (5.17), if s0 < smin, extinction will occur. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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        0      smin       sMSY     sA∞    s          s 
 
Let us assume that the initial resource stock in autarky is the natural carrying 
capacity, s0 = s , and that ( ) ( )P H MSYH L g s< . This means that in autarky, the resource 
eventually reaches an autarkic stable steady state, As∞  such that ( )Ag ' s 0∞ < . For the 
following free trade analysis, we assume that As∞  has been reached in autarky when the 




5.3.6. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
By assumption, in free trade, the resource stock is initially As∞  such that 
( )Ag ' s 0∞ < . The equilibrium autarky price just before trade opens is denoted Ap∞ . Since 
the home country takes world prices as given, we need to analyze two possible cases: 
W Ap p∞> , and 
W Ap p∞< . The special case where 
W Ap p∞=  would lead to an 
undetermined initial and long run pattern of production, although welfare would be the 
same as in autarky. 
 
Case 1. W Ap p∞>  
Proposition 5.1. 
As the home country opens to free trade, it produces more resource good and 
may or may not specialize in it. Welfare is higher initially. The resource good is 
exported, and the manufactured good is imported. If, in free trade, harvest is smaller or 
equal to the resource maximum sustainable yield, i.e., ( )h MSYN h g s≤%%l , then this 
equilibrium is sustainable in the long run; in such a case, utility is higher than in autarky 
forever, and therefore discounted utility is greater. Otherwise, extinction occurs in finite 
time, and afterwards, the home country must export some MP(t) in order to import some 
HC(t). Utility is lower thereafter, although utility discounted to the time when trade 
opens could be higher or lower than it would have been in autarky. 
Proof. 




Because the manufacturing sector production function is strictly concave in 
labor, we may have a positive level of T TM hL L N= − %l  such that ( )W TMp h M ' L=% , in 
which case there would be diversification with trade. However, if ( )Wp h M ' 0≥% , then 
the home country specializes in the resource good. 
 Welfare 
Initially, instantaneous welfare necessarily increases. Indeed, we find that 
( ) P Cv p,Ydv H H dp
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∂
> 0 with the new terms and pattern of trade. 
If ( )T h MSYN h g s≤%%l  in free trade, then the resource is conserved. In that case, a 
positive steady state stock is reached, and the new production pattern continues forever. 
Therefore steady state welfare is higher than in autarky as well as instantaneous welfare. 
The discounted welfare change due to the opening of the home country to free trade is 
therefore positive. 
However, if ( )T h MSYN h g s>%%l , then the resource becomes extinct in finite time. 
Steady state welfare is lower than in autarky since ( ) P Cv p,Ydv H H dp
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∂
 < 0. 
Indeed, with extinction, the trade pattern is reversed, but the terms of trade are fixed. In 
this case, the discounted welfare change due to free trade could be positive or negative, 
depending on the parameters of the economy, namely the discount rate, and other 
parameters which influence the time it takes for the resource stick to reach extinction.  
 
When W Ap p∞> , trade can be immiserizing if it causes the extinction of the 




rights over the resource: gains from trade are mitigated by the dynamic inefficiency, and 
they can even be entirely dissipated. Case 1 of the open access model with trade is 
illustrated in Figure 5.3, for the case where extinction occurs. We note that the 
production possibilities frontier (PPF) does not depend on the magnitude of the resource 
stock, which implies that it remains the same even as the resource stock changes, as 
long as s(t) > 0. 
 
Figure 5.3. Open access resource exploitation and trade, Case 1: W Ap p∞>  
 
  M     steady state production, free trade (worst case scenario) 
 
     steady state production and consumption, autarky 
 
       autarky budget line (slope = - pA) 





steady state consumption, free trade 
 





Case 2. W Ap p∞<  
Proposition 5.2. 
If W Ap p∞< , the home country produces more manufactures than in autarky, and 
it may or may not specialize in it. In either the diversified case or the specialized case, 




and sT∞  > sA∞ . Therefore extinction cannot occur in this case due to trade. Also, 
manufactures are exported and the resource good is imported. Furthermore, utility is 
higher forever. Hence overall, welfare is unambiguously improved, both inter-
temporally and in steady state. 
Proof. 
 Specialization vs. diversification 
Since with diversified production, Wp hω = % , then specialization occurs only if 
( ) WM ' L p h≥ % . However, if ( ) WM ' L p h< % , then labor is hired in the manufactures 
sector up to a level such that ( )T WMM ' L p h= %  is satisfied, and the home country's 
harvest is ( ) ( )P T P TH MH L H L L= − . 
 Welfare 
In this case, instantaneous welfare necessarily increases forever. Indeed, we find 
that ( ) P Cv p,Ydv H H dp
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∂
 > 0, since the last two factors are negative according 
to the terms and pattern of trade. Welfare increases forever because this equilibrium is 
sustainable. Indeed, harvest being smaller than in autarky, by construction the resource 
stock is necessarily conserved. Therefore, steady state and discounted welfare are 
necessarily greater than in autarky.  
 
When W Ap p∞< , welfare is unambiguously improved, in the short and the long 
run, because there are gains from trade, and the dynamic externality due to the open 




eliminated if there is specialization in the manufactures. Case 2 of the open access 
model with trade is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4. Open access resource exploitation and trade, Case 2: W Ap p∞<  
      M     steady state production with free trade 
 
     steady state production and consumption, autarky 
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The welfare results for the open access model with free trade are qualitatively 
comparable to those found in Brander and Taylor (1997a). Indeed, when harvest 
decreases after the home country opens to trade, then steady state welfare decreases as 
compared to autarky, and even discounted welfare could decrease as compared to what 
it would have been in autarky. However, Brander and Taylor's specific functional forms 
made it so that extinction could occur in autarky but not in free trade, which seems 
counterintuitive when thinking of extinction problems. Here however, when pW > Ap∞ , 
we may have extinction under free trade, which seems more plausible when free trade 




in that instantaneous net gain, i.e., 
( )




p t h t t tMax ⎡ ⎤−ω⎣ ⎦
l
l l , is not affected 
directly by the resource stock. However, in a different model where stock affects 
instantaneous net gains, extinction could still be a possible event in open access; see 
Gould (1972) and Hoel (1978) for discussions on extinction with stock dependence of 
instantaneous net gains. 
 
5.3.7. Summary of results for the open access model 
In Tables 5.1 and 5.2, we summarize our findings regarding the possible impact 
of free trade on welfare and resource conservation, when the resource is exploited in 
open access. Recall that we have assumed that, when trade opens, the resource stock is 
at its autarkic steady state, As∞ , such that ( )Ag ' s 0∞ < . There are three possible scenarios 
when pW > pA while there is only one outcome when pW < pA. 
Table 5.1. Open access resource exploitation and trade, Case 1: W App ∞> . 
Long-run 

















Conservation + + + 
Extinction - - + 







Table 5.2. Open access resource exploitation and trade, Case 2: W App ∞< . 
Long-run 

















Conservation - + + Prop. 5.2 Fig. 5.4 
 
 
5.4. First Best World: Costless Management, or Utopia 
The model presented here is the welfare benchmark. The dynamic distortion in 
the home country, due to the lack of property rights on the resource, is corrected at no 
cost through a harvest unit-tax, ( )tτ , imposed on the harvesters. Hence, in this first best 
model, individuals and firms behave optimally, even though they have unilateral 
incentives not to. Indeed, they could cheat and not pay the tax for example, but they do 
not; this is Utopia. 
5.4.1. Production of the resource good 
In this model, the social planner must understand the harvesting firms' behavior 
in order to make them pay the optimal per-unit harvest tax, ( )tτ . Once ( )tτ  is 
optimally set, harvesting firms react to it and behave optimally. As usual, the problem 
must be solved by backward induction. Accordingly, in what follows, we solve the 
harvesting firms' problem first, and then we use the information obtained about their 




5.4.1.1. Harvesting firms 
The resource price, the wage rate and the tax rate are exogenously given to each 
harvesting firm. Since firms do not own the resource, they are open access harvesters. 
As such, they hire labor to maximize static profits, and there is entry of harvesting firms 








p t h t t t t h tMax ⎡ ⎤−ω − τ⎣ ⎦
l
l l l  (5.18) 
The harvesters' first order condition and the open access zero-profit condition 
lead to the same result as before: each firm harvests at its maximum average 
productivity of labor, at level h~ , as defined by equation (5.4). Therefore, we obtain the 
usual result that with a per-unit harvest tax, the quantity of inputs used per firm does not 
change; instead, it is the total number of firms that is affected by the tax. 
Hence, from the first order condition to problem (5.18) and equation (5.4), when 
the resource good is produced in the economy, we must have that 
 ( )







% . (5.19) 
We use the previous definition and notation for the optimal level of hired labor 
by each firm, h%l . Aggregate harvest is still written as ( )( ) ( )P H hH L t N t h= % %l . Since 
h~ and h%l  are constant, it is again through N(t) that equilibrium occurs. Here however, if 
the per-unit harvest tax, ( )tτ , changes through time, N(t) also changes. Hence, harvest 




5.4.1.2. The resource planner 
In this Utopian world, we suppose that a resource planner has the power to 
charge a per-unit harvest tax to the harvesting firms. His objective is to maximize the 
discounted inter-temporal welfare (i.e., total economic surplus) of the resource sector. 
The tax is to be re-distributed in the economy in a non-distortionary manner, and only 
serves to eliminate the dynamic distortion due to the lack of property rights over the 
renewable resource. 
We note that, since the solution to (5.18) is given by equation (5.4), then the 
harvest of each identical harvesting firm is ( )h hh * h= % %l l . Hence, we can write 
aggregate production as ( ) ( )P hH t N t h= % %l in the resource planner's problem. This way, 
the planner charges a tax, τ(t), in order to induce the optimal number of firms, N(t), in 





( ) ( )
hN t h t
hN t 0 0
Max p x dx t N t e dt
∞
−δ⎡ ⎤−ω⎢ ⎥∫ ∫
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
% %l
%l  (5.20) 
subject to 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
h
0
s t g s t N t h
s t 0 s is given






where x is a placeholder. 








H p x dx t N t t g s t N t h= −ω +µ −∫
% %l




where ( )tµ  is the corresponding current value co-state variable or shadow value of the 
resource. Using Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals where appropriate and 
assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions for this problem are as follow. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )hN tH t p N t h h t t h 0= −ω −µ =% % %%% l  (5.22) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )s tH t t t t g ' s t− = µ −µ δ = −µ% &  (5.23) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) htH t s t g s t N t hµ = = − % %% & l  (5.24) 
( ) t
t
lim t e 0−δ
→∞
µ ≥ , ( ) ( )t
t
lim t e s t 0−δ
→∞
µ = . (5.25) 
For an interior solution, the necessary Legendre condition holds: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
hN t N tH t p ' h 0= ⋅ <
% %% l . Second order conditions are also satisfied to guarantee a 
unique solution to this problem. Indeed, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )s t s tH t t g '' s t 0= µ <% , 
( ) ( ) ( )s t N tH t 0=% , and therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
N t N t s t s t s t N tH t H t H t 0− >
% % % , which 
means we have a strictly concave problem. 
We see, by comparing the harvesters' first order condition of problem (5.18) to 
equation (5.22), that the optimal per-unit harvest tax is equal to the resource current 
value marginal rent: ( ) ( )* t * tτ = µ . We then have, ( )( ) ( )
t
h




%  from equation 
(5.19), (5.4) and (5.22), when the resource good is produced in autarky. Also, if 
( )t 0µ >  for s(t) such that g'(s(t)) = δ, then according to (5.23), the unique optimal 
steady state occurs where g'(s(t)) = δ. Therefore, optimally, if g'(0) > δ, the resource is 




we write the steady state stock as ( ){ }*s inf s : g ' s∞ = ≤ δ , which includes both potential 
outcomes since s(t) ≥ 0. 
In order to better understand the dynamics of the resource planner's model, we 
first rewrite (5.22) as ( ) ( )( ) ( )h tt p N t h h
ω
µ = −% %l
%
. From this, we substitute µ into 
(5.23): 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )h tt p N t h g ' s th
ω⎛ ⎞





We find µ&  by differentiating (5.22) with respect to time: 
 ( ) ( ) ht N t p 'hµ = % %&& l  (5.27) 
Therefore, from (5.26) and (5.27), we obtain the path for the number of harvesting firms 
in autarky: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )h
h
g ' s tt
N t p N t h
h p 'h
⎛ ⎞δ −ω⎛ ⎞






In autarky, the resource planner's optimal path for s(t) and HP(t) are monotonic 
over time. As s increases (or decreases) towards its steady state, then the harvest 
increases (decreases) through the increase (decrease) of N(t), until the optimal steady 
state, *s∞ , is attained. 
Proof. 
The optimal steady state stock, *s∞ , was deducted from (5.23). Necessary 




resource, and whose second right-hand-side factor has the sign opposite to that of 
( )s'g−δ . Since g''(s) < 0, it must be that N increases (decreases) as s increases 
(decreases). Since HP = N l~h
~
h , total harvest increases (decreases) with N and s.  
 
Proposition 5.4. 
In autarky, the optimal tax path, ( )tτ , is monotonic; it increases as s(t) 
decreases towards the steady state, and vice versa. 
Proof. 
Since, ( ) ( )* t * tτ = µ , Proposition 5.4 follows directly from equation (5.27) and 
Proposition 5.3.  
 
5.4.2. Production of the manufactured good 
As in the open access model of section 5.3, we find necessary condition (5.7): 
( ) ( )( )Mt M ' L tω = . Given the results we found for resource production in the first best 
model, when both goods are simultaneously produced, we conclude that the marginal 
value products are equalized and equal to the wage rate: 





As we found in the open access model, the necessary conditions on the utility 









= . Aggregated 
demands are the same as (5.11). 
5.4.4. Walrasian equilibrium 
Constraints (5.12) and (5.13) must still be obeyed in the economy, except that 
here, N(t) depends not only on the same parameters as in the open access model, but 
also on the resource stock level, through the shadow price, ( )* tµ , and therefore, 
through the optimal tax, ( )* tτ . Since the resource stock changes over time, ( )* tµ  
does too, and therefore ( )* tτ  as well. This implies that N(t) is not fixed over time. 
5.4.5. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
Equation (5.14)-(5.16) must hold at all times, as in the open access model, but 
now, N(t) depends on the resource stock size through the per-unit harvest tax charged to 
harvesters. The dynamics of the first best model is therefore richer than that of the open 
access model presented in section 5.3. 
We saw that the resource planner's optimal path towards the steady state is 
monotonic in s(t) and that N(t) changes over time. In a general equilibrium setting, a 
change in N(t) will trigger changes elsewhere in the economy, since it implies labor 






General equilibrium dynamic paths are monotonic in this autarkic economy. 
Furthermore, as s increases (decreases) towards its steady state, then the harvest 
increases (decreases), the production of manufactures decreases (increases), the wage 
rate increases (decreases), the relative price of the resource good decreases (increases), 
and the instantaneous welfare of individuals increases (decreases). 
Proof. 
 Production 



















h , so that N varies 
in the same direction as s. For the resource good, at any given time, l~h
~NH h
P = . 
Therefore l&& ~h
~NH h
P = . Hence, HP varies in the same direction as N and s. For the 
manufactured good, at any given time, ( ) ( ) ( )l~NLMLLMLM hPHPMP −=−= . 
Therefore, ( ) l&& ~'MNM hPP ⋅−= . Therefore HP varies in the opposite direction of N and s. 
 Equilibrium prices 




















=== , where ( )C CH h p Y=  and ( )C CM m p Y= . In 
autarkic equilibrium however, MC = MP and HC = HP. This must hold over time in 
autarky, and so we can replace HC&  by HP&  and MC&  by MP&  for the evolution of harvest 
and manufactures over time in the Walrasian equilibrium. We find that, since 










& . Given that H changes in the same 
direction as s, and M changes in the opposite direction, and since for a homothetic 
utility function [ ] 0uuuu MHHHHM <−  and [ ]uuuu MMHMHM − >0, we conclude that 
changes in p are opposite to changes in s. 
From the manufactures production sector, we found that ( )L'M M=ω . Since 
l
~NLL hM −= , we find that ( ) l&& ~''MN hP ⋅−=ω . Therefore, the wage rate, ω, varies in 
the same direction as N and s. 
 Instantaneous welfare 
Welfare changes are measured by changes in the indirect utility function v(p,Y). 
Therefore welfare changes over time as follows 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )






















































∂  in autarky (see Appendix 
IV). Given our assumption of homotheticity of the utility function, then 
( )( )MHppv &&& +ν= , which given our findings above leads to ( ) ( )'Mh~p~Npv h −ν= l&& . 
From equation (5.7), in equilibrium we have M' = ω, and from (5.22), we also have 
0h~h~p >µ=ω− . Then, welfare changes can be rewritten as ( ) h~~Npv h µν= l&& . 










( ) δ=∞s'g A  
   ( ) l~h~sN hA∞  
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The first best autarkic dynamics is illustrated in Figure 5.5 for the resource 
sector. In Table 5.3, we summarize the autarkic trajectories for the first best model. 
 
Table 5.3. Summary of first best autarkic trajectories 
 
Components 
of the economy ↓ 
Initial stock 
→ 0 < s0 < s∞ s∞ < s0 ≤ s  
Resource stock, s(t) increases decreases 
Implicit current value of the 
resource stock, µ(t) decreases increases 
Number of harvesting firms, N(t) increases decreases 
Equilibrium quantity of resource 
good, H(t) increases decreases 
Equilibrium quantity of 
manufactures, M(t) decreases increases 
Wage rate, ω(t) increases decreases 
Relative price, p(t) decreases increases 





5.4.6. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
We assume that g'(0) > δ, and that when trade opens, the resource stock is at its 
autarkic steady state As∞ , such that ( )Ag ' s∞ = δ . The equilibrium autarky price just before 
trade opens is noted Ap∞ . Since we assume that the home country takes world prices as 
given, there are two cases of interest: W App ∞> , and 
W App ∞< . 
 
Case 1. W App ∞>  
Proposition 5.6 
If W App ∞> , production remains the same as in the autarkic steady state forever. 
The home country exports some HP(t) and imports some MC(t). Welfare is always 
higher due to the new international exchange possibilities; hence the discounted welfare 
is higher than it would have been in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than 
it would have been in autarky as well. Finally, the resource is conserved. 
Proof. 
We have W App ∞> . The home country has a comparative advantage in the 
resource good, and therefore, ( )* t 0µ >  with free trade, as it was in autarky. In free 
trade, the steady state stock is unique and is the same as in autarky, since it only 
depends on the discount rate and on the biological growth function: 
( ) ( )A Tg ' g 's s∞ ∞= = δ . The resource is therefore conserved in the long run.  




H= , W App ∞> , and since preferences are 




H and an increase in the consumption of M. However, the same quantity as before is 
produced since the economy is already at the optimal steady state. Therefore, H is 
exported and M is imported. Utility is higher than in autarky initially and forever, since 
the economy is already at its steady state production. 






from the pattern of trade and change in relative price (see Appendix IV). Therefore, 
welfare necessarily increases with free trade in this case, both in the short and long run. 
 
 
Case 1 of the first best model with trade is illustrated in Figure 5.6. We note that 
the autarky budget line is not tangent to the production possibilities frontier (PPF) 
because an inter-temporal user cost is considered in the problem while the PPF is a 
static notion. In the inter-temporal problem, the optimal relative price of the resource is 
greater than it would be in the static problem, such as the open access problem 










production and consumption in autarky;  
production in free trade 
 




     autarky budget line (slope = -pA) 
 
free trade budget line (slope = -pW) 
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Case 2. W App ∞<  
Case 2 in the first best model can be subdivided into two sub cases, depending 
on the magnitude of the change in the relative terms of trade. 
 
Case 2a: ( ) WA AMM ' L h pp∞ ∞⎡ ⎤ < <⎣ ⎦%  
Proposition 5.7a. Production remains the same as in autarky 
If W App ∞< , but the difference between the two relative prices is not great, then 
there is still a positive rent on the resource and therefore it remains managed. 
Production remains the same as in autarky. Given the new, lower relative price, the 
home country exports MP(t) and imports HC(t), which is now relatively cheaper than in 




equilibrium is also a steady state. Therefore, steady state welfare is higher than in 
autarky, and discounted welfare also is. Finally, the resource is conserved. 
Proof. 
If W App ∞< , but the difference between the two relative prices is not great, i.e., smaller 
than the autarkic steady state rent, ( )A t∞µ , then the resource rent is 
( )W A TMM ' L h 0p ∞ ∞⎡ ⎤− = µ >⎣ ⎦% . Since it is positive, the resource remains managed. Since 
( ) ( )A Tg ' s g ' s∞ ∞= = δ , production remains the same and the steady state stock is the same 
as in autarky. Hence the resource is conserved. 
Given the new terms of trade, the consumption of M decreases and that of H 
increases, which, with the production equilibrium and instantaneous budget constraint, 
implies that some HC(t) is imported and MP(t) is exported. 
With free trade, the welfare change initially is ( ) P Cv p,Ydv H H dp 0
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦∂
, 
from the new pattern and terms of trade. Since the home country remains at the same 
steady state, then this situation continues forever; welfare is always higher than it would 
have been in autarky, and therefore discounted welfare is unambiguously higher than it 
would have been in autarky as well.  
 





Figure 5.7. First best management and trade, Case 2a: 
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Case 2b: ( )W A AMM ' L h pp ∞ ∞⎡ ⎤≤ <⎣ ⎦%  
Proposition 5.7b. Production changes with free trade. 
If W App ∞< , and the decrease in relative price of the resource good is large 
enough so that the resource no longer has a positive inter-temporal shadow value, then 
the resource is no longer managed, the home country produces more M(t) than in 
autarky (or the exact same amount if ( )W AMM ' L hp ∞⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦% ) and it exports some of it. It 
produces less, maybe none at all, H(t), and it imports it for at least part of its 




Welfare is always higher; hence the discounted welfare is higher than it would 
have been in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than it would have been in 
autarky as well. Finally, the resource is conserved at a stock greater or equal to As∞ . 
Proof. 
If W App ∞< , and the difference between the two relative prices is large enough, 
i.e., at least the magnitude of the autarkic steady state rent, ( )A t∞µ , then the resource 
rent disappears since ( )W AMM ' L h 0p ∞⎡ ⎤− ≤⎣ ⎦% . 
If ( )W AMM ' L h 0p ∞⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦% , then the resource rent is zero at As∞ , and the 
production pattern remains the same since this is equivalent to having the resource 
being "just managed" because ( ) ( )A Tg ' s g ' s∞ ∞= = δ  and here it turns out that T As s∞ ∞= . In 
that case, the rest of the proof is the same as that of Proposition 5.7a, except that the 
resource rent is exactly zero. 
If ( )W AMM ' L h 0p ∞⎡ ⎤− <⎣ ⎦%  however, then resource management is wasteful, and 
open access is the first best level of resource management. This implies that with the 
new terms of trade, there is no more economic scarcity of the resource stock at As∞ . In 
that case, more MP(t) and less HP(t) are produced. Since the aggregate production of 
manufactures is strictly concave in labor, with trade and W App ∞< , the home country 
will produce more manufactures than in autarky (or the same amount in the special case 
where ( )W AMM ' L hp ∞= % ), and it may or may not specialize in it. Specialization occurs 




manufactures sector up to the point where ( )( ) WTMM ' L t hp= %  is satisfied, which leads 
to diversification. In such instance, the home country's harvest is positive bit less than it 
was in autarky: ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P T P T P AH M H,H L t H L L t H L t∞= − < . 









= , and since preferences are homothetic, and 
the instantaneous budget must be balanced, then the price change leads to an increase in 
the consumption of HC(t) and a decrease in the consumption of MC(t). Along with the 
new production pattern, this implies that at least some HC(t) is imported and some MP(t) 
is exported. 
From the pattern and terms of trade, the initial change in welfare due to trade is 
( ) P Cv p,Ydv H H dp 0
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − ≥⎣ ⎦∂
. 
We conclude that welfare unambiguously increases with trade initially and 
forever. Hence, both steady state and discounted welfare are higner than they would 
have been in autarky. In either the diversified case or the specialized case, the long run 
equilibrium stock with free trade, sT∞ , is such that ( )( ) ( )P TMH L L t g s∞− =  and sT∞  
≥ sA∞ . Therefore when 
W App ∞< , extinction cannot occur due to trade.  
 





Figure 5.8. First best management and trade, Case 2b: 
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5.4.7. Summary of results for the first best model 
In Tables 5.4 and 5.5, we summarize our results about the impact of free trade 
on welfare and resource conservation, for the first best model, which is the welfare 
benchmark. We assume that ( ) δ>0'g , so the resource is always conserved in the long 






Table 5.4. First best resource management and trade, Case 1: W App ∞> . 
Long-run 

















Conservation no change + + Prop. 5.6 Fig. 5.6 
 
Table 5.5. First best resource management and trade, Case 2: W App ∞< . 
Long-run 

















Conservation no change + + Prop. 5.7a Fig. 5.7 
Conservation - + + Prop. 5.7b Fig. 5.8 
 
 
5.5. Second best world: fixed cost of resource management 
In reality, resource management is costly because it requires the use of inputs. 
Different bodies of literature would call this a transactions cost or an agency cost. 
Empirical studies, from Harberger's pioneering estimate of 5% (1964) to more recent 
estimates of up to 300% for the US, have clearly shown that theoretical deadweight 
losses due to taxation have important empirical impacts for a country. In their summary 
of this body of empirical literature, Vedder and Gallaway (1999), retain a cost of 40¢ 
per marginal tax dollar collected in the US as a reasonable midpoint estimate of what 
they consider to be several serious studies. 
In our model, as a rough approximation, we assume that the fiscal apparatus in 




redistribution, no matter what the tax rate may be. This fixed cost needs to be paid at 
each instant when resource taxes are collected; it is a flow fixed cost. We further 
assume that taxpayers do not evade taxation. In subsection 5.5, we analyze the model 
under second best management, in autarky and in free trade, in steady state and along 
the transitory paths. We also compare this second best management regime to the first 
best welfare benchmark. 
 
5.5.1. Production of the resource good 
For this second best model, we first solve the harvesting firms' problem. We 
then use the result into the benevolent social planner's problem. The only difference 
with section 5.4.1 is that the social planner must pay an instantaneous fixed cost to 
manage the resource. 
5.5.1.1. Harvesting firms 
The harvesting firms' problem is the same as in the first best model. From (5.4), 
their equilibrium average harvest is 
( )( )










 = constant. In 
equilibrium, we must have ( )












. Therefore the tax 
chosen by the resource planner, ( )tτ , affects the market price. 
5.5.1.2. The resource planner 
In this second best, more realistic world, the resource planner can charge a per-




in terms of a fixed amount of labor, Lτ(t) = Lτ. In that case, the resource planner's 





( ) ( ) ( )
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hN t 0 0





−ω −ω⎢ ⎥∫ ∫
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
% %l
%l  (5.30) 
subject to 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
h
0
s t g s t N t h
s t 0 s given






where x is a placeholder. 
The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to the resource planner's autarkic 
problem is: 
 ( ) ( )
( )




H t p x dx t N t t L t g s t N t hτ= −ω −ω +µ −∫
% %l
%% %% l l  (5.31) 
where ( )tµ  is the corresponding current value co-state variable. Using Leibnitz' rule of 
differentiation of integrals where appropriate and assuming an interior solution, the 
necessary conditions for this problem are the same as those for the first best model 
(equations (5.22)-(5.25)). Second order conditions therefore hold as well here, and we 
have a strictly concave problem. We therefore obtain the same result as before that 
( ) ( )* t * tτ = µ , but µ*(t) differs from what it was in the first best model because, here, 
the general equilibrium wage rate and price ratio are affected by the cost of the planner's 
policy, ( )t Lτω . Also, the unique steady state of this second best management regime is 




that ( ) δ>0'g . Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, which establish that all paths are on monotonic, 
hold here too. 
5.5.2. Production of the manufactured good 
Again, manufactures are produced according to (5.7): ( ) ( )( )P Mt M ' L tω = . If 
the resource good is also produced, then (5.29) must hold: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )p t * t h p t * t h t−µ = − τ = ω% % . 
5.5.3. Consumption 
Equilibrium price and aggregate demands are as in (5.10) and (5.11) in this 









= , ( ) ( )( ) ( )C CH t h p t Y t=  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )C CM t m p t Y t= . 
5.5.4. Walrasian equilibrium 
The budget constraint (5.13) must be obeyed in the economy: Y(t) = p(t)HP(t) + 
MP(t). Equation (5.12) is however replaced by 
 
( ) ( )
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As in the first best model, N(t) depends on the resource stock level through its 
shadow price, ( )* tµ , and in turn, through the optimal tax, ( )* tτ . 
5.5.5. Autarky: temporary and long-run equilibria 
The dynamics of this second best model is also characterized by equations such 




given s(t), differ because of the use of Lτ in this second best world. Due to the use of 
labor for tax collection and re-distribution, equation (5.16) is replaced by 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )C P PM hM p t Y t M L t M L N t L .τ= = − −%l  (5.33) 
In this second best management regime, Proposition 5.5, on the monotonicity 
and direction of all paths in autarky, also holds. Here however, the use of a portion of 
the labor force Lτ, results in a different wage rate than in the first best model, hence a 
different price ratio, a different consumption and resource extraction path, and a 
different optimal tax as well, since µ(t), the shadow price of the resource, is affected by 
the need for Lτ. 
Indeed, in autarkic equilibrium, the use of Lτ takes labor away from both 
sectors, as compared to the first best, because of the homotheticity of preferences. 
Hence, there is less M(t) and less H(t) produced for any stock level. Producing less M(t) 
implies that, for a given s(t), the wage rate is higher than in the first best model, since 
ω(t) = M'(LM(t)). Even though the necessary conditions of the resource production 
problem are the same as in first best, (5.32) differs from (5.12). There is a greater 
demand on labor, and therefore, a higher equilibrium wage rate than in first best. In 
other words, in this second best model, the solution is similar to exogenously having Lτ 
less labor than in the first best model. Welfare is always lower than in the first best 
model because less goods are produced and therefore, consumed. 
For a given s(t), the autarky equilibrium relative price p(t) differs in an 





( ) ( )








= , we know that ( ) [ ] [ ]
( )
M HH H MH M MH H MM
2
M




Given that H(t) and M(t) both decrease as compared to the first best model, and since 
for our homothetic utility function [ ] 0uuuu MHHHHM <−  and [ ]uuuu MMHMHM − >0, we 
conclude that for any given s(t), the difference in p(t) as compared to the first best is 
unclear. It depends on how much of Lτ was taken from the resource sector and the 
manufactures sector as compared to the first best management regime. 
5.5.6. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
Again, we assume that when free trade occurs, the resource stock is at a positive 
steady state stock such that ( ) δ=∞s'g A . The equilibrium autarky price just before trade 
opens is noted Ap∞ . Since we assume that the home country takes world prices as given, 
then we need to analyze two possible cases: W Ap p∞> , and 
W Ap p∞< . Welfare and 
resource conservation results are similar to those for the first best model. 
 
Case 1. W Ap p∞>  
Proposition 5.8. 
If W App ∞> , production remains the same as in the autarkic steady state forever. 
The home country exports some HP(t) and imports some MC(t). Welfare is always 
higher due to the new international exchange possibilities; hence the discounted welfare 
is higher than it would have been in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than 





See the proof of Proposition 5.6 from section 5.4.6.  
 
Case 2. W Ap p∞<  
Case 2 in the second best model with fixed cost of management can also be 
subdivided into two sub cases, depending on the magnitude of the change in the relative 
terms of trade. 
 
Case 2a: ( )A W AMM ' L h p p∞ ∞⎡ ⎤ < <⎣ ⎦%  
Proposition 5.9a. Production remains the same as in autarky 
If W App ∞< , but the difference between the two relative prices is not great, then 
there is still a positive rent on the resource and therefore it remains managed. 
Production remains the same as in autarky. Given the new, lower relative price, the 
home country exports MP(t) and imports HC(t), which is now relatively cheaper than in 
autarky. Welfare is initially higher, and since production does not change, the initial 
equilibrium is also a steady state. Therefore, steady state welfare is higher than in 
autarky, and discounted welfare also is. Finally, the resource is conserved. 
Proof. 





Case 2b: ( )W A AMp M ' L h p∞ ∞⎡ ⎤< <⎣ ⎦%   
Proposition 5.9b. 
If W App ∞< , and the decrease in relative price of the resource good is large 
enough so that the resource no longer has a positive inter-temporal shadow value, then 
the resource is no longer managed, the home country produces more M(t) than in 
autarky (or the exact same amount if ( )W AMM ' L hp ∞⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦% ) and it exports some of it. It 
produces less, maybe none at all, HP(t), and it imports it for at least part of its 
consumption. It consumes less MC(t) and more HC(t). 
Welfare is always higher; hence the discounted welfare is higher than it would 
have been in autarky, and the steady state welfare is higher than it would have been in 
autarky as well. Finally, the resource is conserved at a stock greater or equal to As∞ . 
Proof. 
See the proof of Proposition 5.7b in section 5.4.6.  
 
In Case 2b of this second best resource management economy, Lτ will be 
reallocated to MP and perhaps HP, depending on whether the economy specializes in the 
manufactures or remains diversified. This is different of course from the first best model 





5.6. Empirically-relevant resource management regimes and regime 
switches 
We now consider the possibility that open access turns out to be the second best 
optimal resource management regime, i.e., that open access is chosen by the resource 
planner when resource management is "too" costly. Hence we allow for open access and 
effective costly management to be optimally chosen at different resource stocks, s(t); 
we call his option The resource management regime problem. 
First, let us point out that for some resource stock range, open access can be the 
first best management regime, i.e., it can be optimal even when resource management is 
costless. This was shown in a continuous time framework by Kemp and Long (1980) 
and by Levhari et al. (1981) in discrete time. This is so because, in a concave infinite 
horizon autonomous problem, the shadow price of the resource, which represents the 
economic scarcity of the resource stock, varies inversely with the resource stock.15 
Therefore, for high resource stocks, the shadow price could be zero, i.e., there could be 
no economic scarcity at all. Open access exploitation of the resource would then be first 
best optimal. In the first best model however, as the resource stock decreases, the 
shadow price of the resource can eventually become positive, and therefore effective 
management can be optimal for smaller stocks. 
                                                 
15 See Long (1979) for a proof that ( ) ( )t s t 0µ ≤&&  for an infinite horizon autonomous 





The same inverse relationship between the shadow price, ( )tµ , and the resource 
stock, s ( )t , holds true in our second best model with fixed cost of management. Indeed, 
our second best problem is also an infinite horizon autonomous problem, which implies 
that the relationship ( ) ( )t s t 0µ ≤&&  must hold (Long, 1979). Equation (5.26) makes it 
clear for our specific model. 
In our second best model however, if ( )* s 0µ >  for large stocks, then open 
access can be the preferred management regime for some resource stock range only 
because of the fixed flow of management cost, not due to lack of economic scarcity. As 
in section 4.4, we consider the possibility that open access is the second best resource 
management regime. First, we must solve the social planner’s resource management 
regime problem. That problem is solved in Appendix IV and we use the necessary 
condition found there in the analysis that follows. As in Chapter 4, at stocks where the 
second best resource management regime changes from costly management to open 
access (or vice versa), we must have ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =% . 
In order to characterize the stock range(s) for which the second best 
management could be open access, we must first describe the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  in 
(s,HP)-space in order to plot it on the phase diagram. To do so, let us use the current 
value Hamiltonian (5.31), and let us simplify the notation slightly by setting the harvest 
level ( )P SP hH N t h= % %l , where NSP is the number of harvesters under costly resource 




( )Pp H h
ω⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠%




p x dx U H=∫ . After some algebraic 
manipulation, we finally obtain the locus 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P P P PH U H p H H p H g s L 0h τ
ω⎛ ⎞= − + − −ω =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%
% . (5.34) 
The characterization of ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  on the phase diagram will be done in a 
similar fashion as in Chapter 4, that is, by considering the zero profit locus, 
( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% , and the surplus locus ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω . 
Assume that the resource manager cares about maximizing total inter-temporal 
welfare from the resource sector, but he does not take general equilibrium externalities 
into account. This implies that he takes ω , the wage rate, as given. As in Chapter 4, we 
will find three cases of interest. Case A occurs when the ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus intersects 
with the zero profit locus, which is also the open access path; we will see that this 
implies that the zero profit locus and the surplus line intersect. In Cases B and C, the 
zero profit locus and the surplus line do not intersect. In Case B the zero profit line is 
above the surplus line for all feasible resource stocks; in Case C it is the opposite. 
 
Case A: The locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  intersects the zero profit line, 
( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
First consider points where the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  intersects the vertical axis, 




the instantaneous consumer surplus generated by costly resource management is equal 
to the instantaneous cost of management, Lτω . Let Hτ be the harvest level that satisfies 
( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω  at s 0= . 
Now consider the point(s) where the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  intersects the zero 
profit line defined by ( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% , or equivalently, with no restriction on g(s), 
( ) ( )Pp H g s 0h
ω⎡ ⎤− =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%
. If an intersection exists, it occurs at (s,HP) that satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P P P P PH H , *,s U H p H H p H g s Lh τ
ω⎡ ⎤µ = − + − −ω⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
%
%  ( ) ( )Pp H g s 0h
ω⎡ ⎤= − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦%
, 
which implies that ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω , the instantaneous consumer surplus 
generated by management is equal to Lτω . Since neither ( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =%  nor 
( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω  depend on s, their slopes are null. Therefore, in Case A, the 
fact that ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  intersects ( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =%  implies that 
( ) ( ) ( )P P P Pp H U H p H H L 0h τ
ω
− = − −ω =% : the zero profit line and the surplus line 
overlap completely. In Case A, given a demand function, a wage rate, and a marginal 
productivity of labor per harvester ( h% ), only one specific fixed amount of resource 
management labor, Lτ, can make this equality hold. This is therefore a special case and 




Figure 5.9 illustrates Case A, where the zero profit line and ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  
intersect, as well as the different regions defined by them. In this special case, the locus 
( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  overlaps with the zero profit line and the surplus line as well. This is a 
case where open access is the second best optimal management regime for all feasible 
resource stocks, given that resource management is costly. 
 
Figure 5.9. Regions delimited by the intersection of loci ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  and 
( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
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ω
− <% , ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− > ω     
    ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  
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In order to gain insight into more general cases, let us characterize the slope of 
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At s=0, ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  always coincides with the surplus locus, whether we are 
analyzing Case A, B or C. 
 
 
Case B: The surplus locus is below the profit line for all feasible stocks. 
In Case B ( )Pp H 0h
ω⎛ ⎞− >⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠%
 at s=0. From (5.35), above the growth function 
where ( )PH g s> , the slope of the ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus is negative, as long as g'(s)>0. 
The slope is negative below the growth function, and it is infinite as it crosses the 
growth function.  
Figure 5.10 illustrates Case B, where the surplus locus is below the zero profit 
line, as well as the different regions defined by them. The ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus is 
illustrated as well. As per (5.35), at s=0, the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  and the surplus locus 
coincide and the slope of ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is negative. The slope is infinite as 
( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  crosses the growth function, and it is positive below it. Therefore, the 
locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is in region (III) of Figure 5.10. It could not be in region (II) since 
H 0>%  there. The locus could possibly be in region (I), but its slope at s=0 takes it away 





Figure 5.10. Case B: ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω  lies below ( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
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We now need to show that the ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus as illustrated in Figure 5.10 
eventually reaches the horizontal axis at some point (sh,0). At that point, equation (5.34) 
becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h
h
H U 0 p 0 0 p 0 g s L
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Since L 0τω > , and ( )p 0 h
ω⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠%


















Case C: The surplus locus is above the profit line for all feasible stocks. 
Case C implies that on the surplus locus, ( )Pp H 0h
ω⎛ ⎞− <⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠%
. In that case, from 
(5.35), the sign of the slope of ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is positive at s=0, and the same as g'(s) 
for all feasible s. Hence it is negative at s s=  and zero at the maximum sustainable 
yield, where g'(s)=0. Figure 5.11 illustrates this case. 
 
Figure 5.11. Case C: ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω  lies above ( )Pp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
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Let us figure out how the surplus line ( ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H Lτ− = ω ) is affected by 




resource manager, Lτω  increases if Lτ , the quantity of labor required to manage the 
resource, increases. Using U'(HP) = p(HP), we find that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )P P P
P
P P
U H p H H L
dH 0.




= >  (5.37) 
The surplus line moves up on the phase diagram as the required labor for resource 
management increases. Hence, with a relatively low cost of resource management, Case 
B occurs. As Lτ  increases, special Case A is reached, and then Case C. 
Let us now characterize how the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  changes in Case B as Lτ  
increases. Using (5.34), we find 
 










which means that HP increases above the growth function (since ( ) Pg s H⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ <0) and 
decreases below the growth function if Lτ  increase. Also, we find that 
 
( ) ( )PH 0
ds









which implies that the stock increases as Lτ  increases as long as g'(s)>0: the stock is 
smaller than the maximum sustainable yield. Overall then, as Lτ  increases, the area 
encompassed by the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =% , and therefore the area for which 
( )PH H , *,s 0µ <% , increases. 
Now let us do the long run analysis, i.e., the analysis that takes general 




diagram. While the resource manager does not take these considerations into account 
directly, he will perceive that the parameters of the economy change as the resource 
stock changes and we assume he will adjust accordingly. The parameter that changes as 
the resource stock changes under management is the wage rate: ( )sω = ω  and 
( )' s 0ω > , as reported in Table 5.3. Hence both the zero profit line and the surplus locus 
will move as the resource stock does.  
In the long run, the zero profit line is ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− =% . Its slope is no longer 





ds p ' H
ω
= < .16 Similarly, the surplus locus is 
( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  and its slope is ( )( )
P
P P
' s LdH 0
ds p ' H H
τ−ω= > . These long term 
zero profit and surplus loci can cross or not, leading to three long term cases as depicted 
in Figures 5.12-5.14. 
Figure 5.12 illustrates general equilibrium Case AGE, where the zero profit line 
and ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  intersect, as well as the different regions defined by them. Figure 
                                                 
16 The equation ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− =%  is used here only for the purpose of characterizing 
the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  in general equilibrium. In this model where instantaneous 
returns do not depend the s(t), actual open access behavior (zero profit path) implies a 
fixed division of labor in general equilibrium, and therefore, a fixed wage rate, ω , as 




5.13 illustrates Case BGE, where the surplus locus is below the zero profit line for all 
feasible stocks. Figure 5.14 shows Case CGE, where the surplus locus is above the profit 
line for all feasible stocks. 
We want to characterize the shape of the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  in these figures. 
In general equilibrium, we substitute ω  by ( )sω  in (5.34) and obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P P P P sH U H p H H p H g s s L 0h τ
ω⎛ ⎞
= − + − −ω =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%
% . (5.40) 
As before, at s=0, the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  coincides with 
( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  in all three cases. The slope of ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




H H , *,s 0
s g s
p H g ' s ' s L
h hdH
ds p ' H H g s
τ
µ =
ω⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤
− −ω +⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥




We keep a similar nomenclature as impartial equilibrium (Case A, B and C 
become AGE, BGE and CGE), but we analyze the cases in reverse order. The simplest case 
is Case CGE, illustrated in Figure 5.12; the surplus line lies above the zero profit line. At 
s=0, since ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  coincides with ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω , and the 




. Also, at that point, 
( )P PH g s H 0⎡ ⎤− = >⎣ ⎦ . Since ( )g ' 0 0> , then 
( )P
P






 at s=0. Notice that at 




( ) ( )g s' s L 0
h τ
⎡ ⎤
ω + >⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦%
 for all feasible stocks and since ( )g '' s 0< , we could have 
( )P
P






 at a stock such that MSYs s s< < , or the slope could remain positive 
for the entire range of feasible stock. Hence in Case CGE, open access is the second best 
management regime for all feasible stocks. 
A slightly more complicated case is Case BGE, illustrated in Figure 5.13. As 
usual, at s=0, ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  coincides with ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω . Since the 
surplus line is below the zero profit line for all feasible stocks, then 




 for all feasible stocks. Also, at s=0, ( )P PH g s H 0⎡ ⎤− = >⎣ ⎦ . From 
(5.41), the slope of the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is indeterminate at s=0. However, if it 
were positive, the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  would be in the area between the zero profit 
line and the surplus line where we know that ( )PH H , *,s 0µ >% . This means that the only 
possibility in Case BGE is 
( )P
P
















, and then below the growth function, the slope is 
positive. Alternatively in Case BGE, it is possible that the ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus has a 
null slope at some positive stock and then a positive slope before meeting the surplus 




it leads to open access for all possible stocks. Both possibilities are illustrated on Figure 
5.13 as ( )PAH H , *,s 0µ =%  and ( )PBH H , *,s 0µ =% . 
The most complicated case is Case AGE, illustrated in Figure 5.14. From the 
partial equilibrium analysis of Figure 5.11 and the general equilibrium analysis of 
Figure 5.12, we know that at stocks greater than the stock where the zero profit and the 
surplus lines intersect, the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is above the surplus and zero profit 
lines. At the intersection, locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  also intersects the two lines and from 





( )PH g s 0⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦ . 
We know that at s=0, the locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  and the surplus line coincide at 
Hτ. Also, at s=0, the slope of ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is negative. Since the locus 
( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  is continuous, we conclude that its slope becomes null as s increases, 
and then it becomes positive so the locus reaches the intersection of the zero profit and 
surplus lines from the left hand side as well. The locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  never crosses the 
growth function since its slope would be reversed under the growth function and it 
would move away from the intersection between the zero profit and the surplus lines. 
See Figure 5.14. We conclude that in Case AGE, open access is the second best 
management for all feasible stocks. Hence only in Case BGE, where the surplus line lies 




As the fixed flow of management cost varies, locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  varies in a 
similar way as we found before. Indeed, HP varies in the same way as in the partial 
equilibrium (see equation (5.38)): above the growth function, HP increases as Lτ 
increases, and below the growth function, it decreases as Lτ decreases. Therefore, as the 
fixed flow of management cost increases, the area for which ( )PH H , *,s 0µ <%  expands, 
like was found in the partial equilibrium analysis. 
 
Figure 5.12. Case CGE: ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  lies above ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
 H         ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  
(I) ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− <% ; ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− > ω  
      ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  
Hτ   ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− <% , ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− < ω  
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− =%  
 
  (II) ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− >% , ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− < ω  
 





Figure 5.13. Case BGE: ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  lies below ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− =% . 
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− >% , ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− > ω  
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Figure 5.14. Case AGE: ( ) ( ) ( )P P PU H p H H s Lτ− = ω  and ( ) ( )P sp H 0h
ω
− =%  intersect. 
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We are now ready to do the trade analysis with the possibility that open access 
or costly management can be second best optimal. We assume that when the country 
opens to free trade, the resource stock is above the maximum sustainable yield, where 
g'(0)=0. 
Cases CGE and AGE, presented in Figures 5.12 and 5.14, lead to open access 
exploitation for all stocks. In Case BGE, presented in Figure 5.13, we found that costly 
management for could be second best optimal for larger stocks. In the long run, what 
matters is if ( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ <%  or if ( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ ≥% . Only in the later case could we 
reach the optimal steady state. Otherwise, open access is preferred at s= *s∞  and 




In the next section, we examine the impact of free trade on welfare and 
conservation in the home country. 
 
5.6.1. Free trade: temporary and long-run equilibria 
The equilibrium autarky price just before trade opens is noted Ap∞ . We assume 
that a steady state, As∞ , has been attained in open access in autarky, such that 
( )Ag ' s 0∞ ≤ . Hence the resource is conserved in autarky. Again, let us look at the two 
cases: W App ∞>  and 
W App ∞< . 
Case 1. W Ap p∞>  
Results in Case 1 depend on how large Wp  is in relation to the parameters of the 
home country. Scenario (i) occurs if the home country has a relatively small 
comparative advantage in the resource good. In this scenario, Wp  is greater than Ap∞ , 
but not be enough to trigger costly management. There are two possible outcomes in 
that scenario. The first outcome occurs as open access leads to greater harvest, but 
instantaneous harvest smaller than the maximum sustainable yield harvest. In that 
outcome, the resource is conserved and welfare is greater immediately as the country 
opens to trade and forever after. The second outcome occurs if open access leads to 
greater harvest that is larger than the maximum sustainable yield harvest. In that 
outcome, the resource becomes extinct. Welfare is greater than in autarky immediately 
as the country opens to trade but it is smaller once extinction occurs. The change in 




ambiguous. This outcome is the worst-case scenario where free trade allows greater 
exchange possibilities, but exacerbates the open access exploitation problem, which 
ultimately impoverishes the home country. 
Scenario (ii) occurs if the home country has an important comparative 
advantage in the resource good. In this scenario, the difference between Wp  and Ap∞  is 
large enough to trigger costly management. Initially the resource stock decreases under 
costly management. Two outcomes exist in this scenario as well. The first outcome 
occurs if ( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ ≥% . In this outcome, the steady state is the infinite horizon 
steady state, *s∞ . This outcome is a complete success story of free trade, because free 
trade not only generates more wealth but also triggers institutional changes for resource 
management that lessen the dynamic distortion in the home country. Welfare is initially 
greater than under autarky and discounted welfare from free trade is greater than in 
autarky. Steady state welfare may be greater or lower than in autarky. In the second 
outcome of scenario (ii), ( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ <% , so under costly management a finite horizon 
path is followed until the open access zero profit line 17 and the ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  locus 18 
are reached simultaneously. Afterwards, the resource is exploited in open access and 
extinction is eventually reached. Initial welfare is greater than in autarky, steady state 
                                                 
17 The finite horizon transversality condition *s 0µ =  is respected since * 0µ = . 





welfare is lower and the change in discounted welfare in free trade compared to autarky 
is ambiguous. 
Let us analyze both scenarios in more details. 
 
Scenario (i): open access under free trade 
In scenario (i) of Case 1, even though W App ∞> , open access can still be the 
preferred resource exploitation regime under free trade. This is because the cost of 
management, ( ) Tt Lω , could still be prohibitively high and render resource 
management welfare-decreasing as compared to open access exploitation. The 




In scenario (i) of Case 1, as the home country opens to free trade, it produces 
more resource good and may or may not specialize in it. In any case, welfare is higher 
initially. The resource good is exported, and the manufactured good is imported. In the 
first outcome, under free trade, harvest is smaller or equal to the resource maximum 
sustainable yield, i.e., ( )P h MSYH N h g s= ≤%%l , so this equilibrium is sustainable in the 
long run; in such a case, utility is higher than in autarky forever, and therefore 
discounted utility is greater. In the second outcome of this scenario, harvest is greater 
than the resource maximum sustainable yield, i.e., ( )P h MSYH N h g s= >%%l . As a result, 




to import some HC(t), even though W Ap p∞> . Utility is lower thereafter, although utility 
discounted to the time when trade opens could be higher or lower than it would have 
been in autarky since it is initially higher until extinction is reached. 
Proof. 
See the proof of Proposition 5.1 in section 5.3.6.  
 
In this second outcome of scenario (i), therefore, second best management could 
lead both to extinction, to a decrease in steady state welfare, and possibly to lower 
discounted inter-temporal welfare as compared to the autarkic steady state alternative. 
This scenario is the least appealing for free trade; autarky could be better, both for 
welfare and conservation, even though with trade, open access is second best optimal 
from the resource planner's standpoint. Hence, trade can be inter-temporally welfare-
decreasing, even with "proper" management, i.e., second best management. 
For illustrative purposes of Proposition 5.10, see Figure 5.15, in which welfare 
is unambiguously increased with free trade and the resource is conserved (scenario (i)), 
and Figure 5.16, in which the resource becomes extinct with free trade, and steady state 
welfare is decreased; again, discounted welfare could also be lower than it would have 




Figure 5.15. One possible second best outcome; scenario (i) 
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Figure 5.16. Another possible second best outcome; scenario (i) 
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Scenario (ii): costly management under free trade 
In this scenario, we assume that the comparative advantage of the home country 
in the resource good is important, which leads to costly management at the moment 
when the country is opened to free trade. This means that the world price Wp  is equal or 
greater than the critical relative world price (which depends on the resource stock), 
( )( )WCp s t . The critical relative world price is the minimum price that triggers a change 
from open access exploitation to costly resource management. Hence, ( )( )WCp s t  is such 
that ( )P AH H , *,s 0∞µ =%  under free trade. In scenario (ii) therefore, ( )( )W WCp p s t≥ . 
 
Proposition 5.11a. 
In scenario (ii) of Case 1, where free trade triggers resource management, then 
HP initially increases, MP initially decreases, consumption in HC decreases and MC 
increases. HP is exported and MC is imported. 
Initial welfare increases, but it decreases as the resource stock and HP decrease, 
and as MP increases. There could be trade reversal at some point, if HP decreases and 
MP increases enough. Welfare would then be lower than it would have been in autarky, 
and it would be so until the new steady state, Ts∞ , is reached. As long as ( ) δ>0'g , Ts∞  is 
such that ( )Tg ' s∞ = δ . Hence, the resource is conserved in the long run. 
Regardless of the instantaneous welfare comparison with autarky, discounted 





The new terms of trade imply that initially HP increases, MP decreases, 
consumption in HC decreases and it increases in MC. Initially, some HP is exported and 
some MC is imported. Therefore, initial welfare increases: P Cvdv H H dp 0
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦∂
. 
However, there could be trade reversal on the optimal path, if HP decreases and 
MP increases until 
( )( )





H ' L tu hp
u M ' L L t L M ' L L t Lτ τ
= < =
− − − −
%
. Then 
welfare would be lower than it would have been in autarky. It would be so until the new 
steady state Ts∞  is reached because H
P decreases and MP increases until then. In that 
case, steady state welfare would be lower than it would have been in autarky. 
However, if resource management is chosen between the initial free trade 
resource stock and the steady state resource stock, Ts∞ , such that ( )Tg ' s∞ = δ , then by the 
Maximum Principle, it must lead to a higher discounted stream of welfare than open 
access would. 
If steady state harvest in free trade is greater or equal to the steady state harvest 
in autarky, i.e., ( ) ( )T AP PH H
∞ ∞
> , then, given the terms of trade, steady state welfare is 
unambiguously greater in free trade than in autarky: P Cvdv H H dp 0
Y
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦∂
. 
However, if ( ) ( )T AP PH H
∞ ∞
< , then for a large enough difference in the steady state 
harvests, steady state welfare could be smaller than in autarky. However, discounted 
welfare is greater in free trade with management than in autarky under open access, 






See Figure 5.17 for the outcome of scenario (ii) treated in Proposition 5.11a. In 
relation to the location of locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  on the phase diagram, the critical world 
price, Wc,p ∞ , above which conservation occurs and below which we could have extinction 
is given by condition ( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ =% . The only instance of locus ( )PH H , *,s 0µ =%  
under which management can occur is Case BGE (see Figure 5.13, locus 
( )PAH H , *,s 0µ =% ). 
 
Figure 5.17. One possible second best outcome; scenario (ii) 
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Proposition 5.11b. 
In this other possible outcome of scenario (ii), the home country's comparative 
advantage in the resource good triggers resource management as the country is opened 




decreases and MC increases. HP is exported and MC is imported. Consequently, initial 
welfare increases 
As the stock decreases, open access becomes second best optimal (because 
( )P *H H , *,s 0∞µ <% ). This means that extinction eventually occurs and from that time on, 
welfare is lower than in autarky. Welfare is initially higher than in autarky and it is 
lower in the long run. The change in discounted welfare due to the free trade regime as 
compared to the autarkic steady state is ambiguous. 
 
Proof. 
For the portion of the transitory path where costly management is second best 
optimal, the proof proceeds as for Proposition 5.11a. For the portion where open access 
is optimal, the proof proceeds as that of Proposition 5.1, section 5.3.6.  
 
See Figure 5.1819 for the outcome of scenario (ii) treated in Proposition 5.11b. 
 
                                                 
19 In Figure 5.18, there is a discrete jump in harvest between the open access and second 
best management regime. This is due to the full employment constraint and the 
homotheticity of preferences, which together imply that the fixed management input, 
Lt, must be diverted towards, the resource sector in part and the manufactures sector in 




Figure 5.18. Another possible second best outcome; scenario (ii) 
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Case 2. W App ∞<  
Results here are as in the same case for the open access model: welfare is 
unambiguously improved and extinction is prevented. 
 
Proposition 5.12. 
If W Ap p∞< , the home country produces more manufactures than in autarky, and 
it may or may not specialize in it. In either the diversified case or the specialized case, 
the long run equilibrium stock with free trade, sT∞ , is such that ( ) ( )P T TMH L L g s∞− =  
and sT∞  > sA∞ . Therefore extinction cannot occur in this case due to trade. Also, 




higher initially and forever. Hence overall, welfare is unambiguously improved, both 
inter-temporally and in steady state. 
Proof. 
See the proof of Proposition 5.2 in section 5.3.6.  
 
When W App ∞< , even though the resource may remain exploited under open 
access, there are net gains from trade because the dynamic externality due to the open 
access exploitation regime is lessened under diversification or altogether eliminated if 
there is specialization in the manufactures. Also, usual gains from trade are realized by 
producing more manufactures. Overall then, welfare is unambiguously improved. 
 
The results of a change in trade regime with costly resource management are 


































Conservation + + + Prop. 5.10 Fig. 5.15 
Extinction - - + Open access20 
Extinction - - - 
Prop. 5.10 
Fig.5.16; 












Conservation No change + + Prop. 5.8 Fig. 5.6 
 
                                                 
20 With stock dependence of instantaneous net gains, welfare change could be negative even without extinction. This occurs, for 





































Conservation No change + + Prop. 5.9a Fig. 5.7 Effective costly 
management 





5.7. Policy implications 
In economics, it is common to hear that trade unambiguously raises welfare if 
proper environmental policies are in place. This is true only for the empirically 
irrelevant first best world where resource management is costless. However, due to 
costly resource management, "proper" management of the resource is less than perfect. 
In a second best world, where renewable resource management is not free, trade does 
not unambiguously raise welfare when "proper" environmental policies are in place. 
Some cases illustrating this finding have been shown. 
A very contemporary question is whether freer trade helps or hinders 
environmental protection. We obtained a partial answer to this, by looking at whether or 
not free trade can cause the extinction of a renewable resource. The answer is yes, free 
trade can cause the extinction of a species. Therefore, we conclude that freer trade can 
hinder the environment. However, it could also help it, if it triggers better resource 
management, which can also happen in some cases. Therefore, there is ambiguity in the 
answer to this question; it depends on which case is considered. 
In international trade theory, it is often said that the removal of trade restrictions 
and distortions can yield benefits for trading nations and for the environment. While this 
may be true for agricultural export subsidies for example, it is not so clear for 
environmental policies in general. In fact, we found that trade tariffs for a resource good 
can be second best optimal, when resource management is costly. Such policies can be 
welfare increasing for a resource good-exporting country with prohibitively high 
resource management cost. Let us recall that, for endogenous distortions, Bhagwati, 




cum-subsidy as competing second best policies when the first best policy is not feasible. 
In our model, a tax-cum-subsidy on factor input implies taxation on labor in the 
resource good sector. A tariff means that exporters of the resource good would pay 
some percentage of their export revenues. Both alternatives entail the collection and re-
distribution of a tax or tariff. 
Trade tariffs can also be beneficial for an resource good-importing country 
(importing from the home country) that values the in situ resource stock, and therefore 
may agree to bear part of the cost of conservation policy. Therefore, trade tariffs for the 
resource good can be second best optimal, as opposed to trade tariffs on "normal" (not 
resource-based) goods. 
Given our results, an important question is: "In which cases must we be careful 
about free trade in the presence of a resource-based production sector?" In our model, if 
resource management is ineffective or weak in autarky, then the relative price increase 
due to trade needs to be either low enough to allow conservation in autarky (see 
Proposition 5.10, Figure 5.15) or high enough to trigger effective costly management 
leading to a positive steady state (see Proposition 5.11a, Figure 5.17). Otherwise, the 
losses due to greater harvest with ineffective resource management could overcome the 
gains from trade. 
Knowing this, what can be done? Trade tariffs for the resource good are a 
possible type of policy, which in time could perhaps be decreased if some level of trade-
based growth promotes the improvement of resource management technology. Our 
model does not address this possibility directly however, and it seems like an interesting 




Aid in the form of technology transfer and expertise could also be considered, 
but their positive effect on resource management would be long term. Such 
international cooperation already exists under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES, an international 
environmental voluntary agreement, was introduced in 1973, to keep track of renewable 
resources being traded worldwide, to protect them from illegal trade and possibly from 
extinction. CITES policies generally are trade quotas and trade bans. We note however 
that our model serves to show that free trade can be welfare-decreasing for nations that 
have ineffectively managed resources in general, not endangered resources only. 
Unfortunately, current policy under CITES only covers the resources that are in danger 
of extinction, and WTO policy prevents trade tariffs unless a species is covered under 
CITES. Hence, there seems to be a gap in current policy relating to renewable resources 
that are traded. 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have proposed a trade model where the benevolent resource 
planner's management is costly and therefore endogenous. This allows for the analysis 
of free trade impacts when resource management regimes other than the polar open 
access and first best regimes. Interestingly, the second best endogenous management 
considered is more realistic than the textbook first best policy prescription. 
With a model where instantaneous net gains do not depend on the resource 
stock, and where resource management incurs an instantaneous fixed cost, we have 




cases where it could be welfare-decreasing. We have also shown that free trade can 
cause the extinction of a resource and that this is welfare decreasing, at least in steady 
state, but perhaps even when we consider the discounted stream of welfare under free 
trade. Overall, we have characterized the impact of free trade on social welfare and on 
the conservation of the resource under open access exploitation of the resource, in the 
first best management regime and under costly management of the resource, i.e., under 
a second best policy. More specifically, in the second best model, we have characterized 
cases where the move from autarky to free trade can be welfare decreasing, and by 
extension, where some level of barrier to trade would be better. 
Furthermore, we have considered second best, empirically relevant, resource 
management switches and characterized cases where the resource management regime 
could change as a result of a change in trade regime, going from autarky to free trade.  
We have also characterized cases where the move from autarky to free trade can 
cause the extinction of the renewable resource. For this, we explicitly took the dynamic 
constraints and potential irreversibility into account, which are often ignored in 
renewable resource models that consider international trade and concentrate on positive 
steady state results only. 
Finally, we want to make it clear that there are cases where trade is welfare 
increasing and where it also can help the environment. But knowing when it does not 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
The main motivation for this dissertation was that while property right problems 
and policy prescriptions are clear, open access exploitation is still observed empirically. 
The fact that resource management is costly can explain empirical observations. 
Another motivation was the growing interest for the impact of free trade of natural 
resources. The empirically relevant resource management cost was identified as a 
distortion compared to the first best model, which leads to second best analyses. Costly 
resource management was considered not only in partial equilibrium, but also in trade 
analyses, where welfare and resource conservation were analyzed, moving from autarky 
to free trade. For this, we have developed applied theoretical bio-economic models to 
analyze renewable resource dynamic problems in continuous time, making use of the 
Maximum Principle developed in optimal control theory. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we developed partial equilibrium models, where 
management cost was assumed to be either an enforcement cost against poaching or an 
instantaneous fixed cost of tax collection and re-distribution. In Chapter 3, we have 
characterized the optimal policy for the management of a scarce renewable resource. 
We have explained how it may be optimal to observe legal and illegal harvests 
separately or simultaneously. Furthermore, we provided policy prescriptions for a 
scarce renewable resource that is owned by a sole owner who wishes to act as a 
monopolist (the pseudo-monopolist). We have also considered resource non-market 
values, and we provided policy prescriptions that take them into account. In Chapter 4, 




management costs can affect the conservation of the resource negatively, irrespective of 
the discount rate. 
In Chapter 5, international trade was explicitly considered. We characterized the 
impact of free trade on social welfare and on the conservation of the resource under 
different resource management regimes. We showed that the empirically relevant 
second best management regimes and regime switches can render free trade discounted 
welfare decreasing, even with "proper" management. In such instances, some level of 
barrier to trade would be better than free trade. We have also shown that in the 
empirically relevant second best model, free trade can cause the extinction of the 
renewable resource, which we interpret as free trade hurting the environment. In the 
debate over international trade and the environment, rather than taking a one-sided 
stance, we find it important to understand the pros and cons of free trade, so that proper 
policy can be put in place. 
The importance of relative resource management costs is likely greater in poorer 
countries. Therefore, our findings are especially important for less developed economies 
that consider relying more on the export of their renewable resources to trigger 
economic growth. In some cases it may be a good solution, while in others, it can turn 
out to be immiserizing, even in terms of discounted welfare. 
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate distributional issues, by 
replacing our implicit social welfare function with one that takes wealth distribution 
into account, both in partial equilibrium models and in trade frameworks. In relation to 
international trade, a natural extension to Chapter 5 would be the analysis of a trade 




it would be interesting to go one step further and consider a growth model where initial 
trade-generated wealth can be invested into better resource management technologies 




APPENDIX I: DETAILS ON CITES-REGULATED SPECIES 
 
Table I.A.1. Statistics on CITES-listed species 
 Appendix Ia Appendix IIa Appendix IIIa 
 Sppb Ssppc Popnsd Spp Sspp Popns Spp Sspp Popns 
Mammals 228 21 13 369 34 14 57 11 0 
Birds 146 19 2 1401 8 1 149 0 0 
Reptiles 67 3 4 508 3 4 25 0 0 
Amphibians 16 0 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 
Fish 9 0 0 68 0 0 0 0 0 
Invertebrates 63 5 0 2030 1 0 16 0 0 
Plants 298 4 0 28074 3 6 45 1 2 
Total 827 52 19 32540 49 25 292 12 2 
 
Legend: 
a: CITES listings: species in CITES Appendix I are most endangered and most 
severely regulated (trade bans typically); species in CITES Appendix II are less 
endangered and less regulated (trade quotas typically); species in CITES Appendix 
III are not endangered yet or their level of endangerment is unknown, and data is 







APPENDIX II: STEADY STATE ANALYSIS, CROPPER ET AL. (1979) 
In this appendix, we show how to obtain Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 in our model, 
by summarizing Cropper et al.'s (1979) analysis. For this, we use our two loci in (s,Q)-
space: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )s t g s t Q t 0= − =&  (4.24) 
and 
 ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t g s t
Q t 0
P ' Q t
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− δ − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= =& . (4.26) 
In (s, Q)-space, (4.24) is easy to draw for a compensatory biological growth 
function. However, locus (4.26) needs more analysis for plotting. Since P'(Q(t)) < 0, 
(4.26) implies that the following equation must hold along locus ( )Q t 0=& : 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t g ' s t K ' s t g s t 0⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− δ − + =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . (II.A.1) 
To characterize the shape of ( )Q t 0=& , we differentiate (II.A.1) and obtain 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )Q t 0
dQ t K ' g ' g '' P K K ''g K 'g '
ds t P ' g '
=




From the assumptions on the different functions, the slope of ( )Q t 0=&  is strictly 
positive for s > sm because g'(s > sm) < 0. For s < sm, it is indeterminate. 
The line ( ) ( ) 0sKQP =−  on both Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 separates the area 
that yield instantaneous positive net marginal benefit, below the line, and the area that 





( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )t 0
M 0
K ' s tdQ t
0
ds t P ' Q tπ =
=
= > . Its second derivative with respect to s(t) is 
( )







ds t K '' s t
0





⎣ ⎦ = < , which means that the ( ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = )-locus 
is increasing and concave in (s,Q)-space. Also, as long as ( )g ' 0 ≠ δ , then the line 
( ) ( ) 0sKQP =−  and the locus ( )Q t 0=&  coincide at s 0=  and at s s= . 
In order to gain insight into ( )Q t 0=&  for the interval s < sm, we separate the 
analysis in two, which will lead to two phase diagrams, depending on whether 
( )g ' 0δ < , which leads to Figure 4.2 or ( )g ' 0δ > , which leads to Figure 4.3. Let us 
analyze them successively. 
 
Phase diagram for δ < g'(0) (Figure 4.2 or II.1)) 
The stock level s%  is such that ( )g ' sδ = % . The position of ( )Q t 0=&  when 
( )g ' 0δ <  depends on which side of s%  the locus is. 
For s < s% , since K'g < 0, then from (II.A.1) the optimal locus is such that 
( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− < . Hence, ( )Q t 0=&  lies above the line ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = , in 
the region where instantaneous net marginal benefit are negative. This means that any 
equilibria to the left of s%  are suboptimal. 
For s > s% , ( )Q t 0=&  lies below the line ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = . The only 




steady state exists in the interval (s, s )% we have to show that the two loci intersect at 
least once in that interval. 
The locus ( )Q t 0=&  intersects the s-axis at ŝ , where ŝ  is the smallest stock level  
for which the following equation holds: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
K ' s g s
P 0 K s s
g ' s
−
= + ≡ Ψ
δ−
. (II.A.3) 







( ) ( ) ( )
s s




, then equation (II.A.3) must have a solution in the interval 
(s, s )% . 
Since ( )Q t 0=&  is below ( )s t 0=&  at ŝ  and above it at s , then it must intersect 
( )s t 0=&  at least once between these points. If it intersects it more than once, it must be 
an odd number of times. 
Also, ( )Q t 0=&  must intersect ( )s t 0=&  from below first. This is because the first 
steady state stock, s*1 , for which condition ( )( ) ( )P g s s= Ψ , s s s< <% , necessarily lies 
to the right of ŝ . This is because ( ) ( )( )P 0 P g s> , s s s< <% , and ( )sΨ  is initially 




Figure II.1. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Costless 
Enforcement; ( )0'g<δ  
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Phase diagram for δ > g'(0) (Figure 4.3 or Figure II.2) 
In this case, (II.A.1) implies that ( )Q t 0=&  is below the line 
( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− =  for the entire domain of s. The parameter assumption ( )g ' 0δ >  
does not restrict the slope of ( )Q t 0=&  for s < sm, but this slope is necessarily positive 
for the entire domain of s if ( )2g ' 0δ > . In Figure 4.2, we have therefore assumed that 




From the shape of ( )( ) ( )( )P Q t K s t 0− = , the fact that it has a positive Q-
intercept, and  that ( )Q t 0=&  coincides with it at s 0=  and at s s= . This implies that 
( )Q t 0=&  and ( )s t 0=&  intersect an even number of times or not at all. If there is at least 
one intersection, since ( )Q t 0=&  has a positive Q-intercept, then ( )Q t 0=&  must 
approach ( )s t 0=&  from above. This means that s*1  is an unstable steady state 
(saddlepoint). 
 
Figure II.2. Steady State Equilibria with Stock-Dependent Harvest Costs and Costless 
Enforcement, ( )0'g>δ  
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APPENDIX III: NOTES ON WELFARE COMPARISONS FOR 
CHAPTER 5 
A.III.1 Welfare comparisons using the indirect utility function in autarky 
With homothetic utility functions, the expenditure function is written as E(p,µ) = 
e(p)µ, where µ is the utility level attained and e(p) ≡ E(p,1) is the unit (utility) 
expenditure function. We note that e(p) can be interpreted as a price index or a "cost of 
living" index. By duality, the corresponding indirect utility function then takes the form: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )v v p, Y Y e p p Y= = = ν . (III.A.1) 
Changes in welfare can be measured by changes in indirect utility as follows: 










= . (III.A.2) 
We know that the economy's income is PP MpHY += . Therefore, 
 PPP dMpdHdpHdY ++= . (III.A.3) 
This gives us a way of measuring welfare changes. Using (III.A.3), we obtain 
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By Roy's identity, the first term of the factor in brackets -HC. The factor in brackets is 
therefore the excess demand for H in the home country. In autarky, demand equals 
supply within the economy, and therefore 










A.III.2 Welfare comparisons in free trade, using the indirect trade utility function 
Since we assume no possibility of saving and borrowing, then we still have 
PP MpHY +=  in free trade. We also suppose that prices are exogenous to the home 
country. That means that in equilibrium, HP = HP(LH(p)) and MP = MP(LH(p)). 
Therefore, using the first order condition of the GNP maximizing problem21, we find 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
P P





dH L p dM L L p LdY p dLH L p p
dp dL dL dp
H L p .




This is Hotelling's lemma, which makes use of the envelope theorem. With this result, 
using the indirect trade utility function22, we characterize the welfare changes due to 
free trade. Our small country assumption implies that price is exogenous. The indirect 
trade utility function is ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v v p, Y p Y p e p p Y p .= = = ν  The welfare change 
is 
                                                 




Max Y pH L M L L L= + − − . Assuming an interior 








+ = , 
which leads to the unique solution LH = LH(p). 
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v p, Y p v p, Y p dY p
dv dp dp
p Y p dp
v p, Y p v p, Y p
dp H L p dp
p Y p
v p, Y p v p, Y p v p, Y p
H L p dp.
p YY p
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ⎛ ⎞
= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂
= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
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The equation can be written more simply, by making use of Roy's Identity: 
( )( )




dv H L p H dp.
Y p
∂
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦∂
   (III.A.7) 
 Therefore, the change in welfare, dv, is proportional to the net export of the resource 




APPENDIX IV. THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REGIME 
PROBLEM AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
Much like in Chapter 4, in our trade model from Chapter 5, the social planner's 
problem of choosing between costly management and open access is a timing problem 
since switches can occur across management regimes as the resource stock varies. The 
timing of resource management regime switch(es) is a problem that includes the 
resource management sub-problems in open access (presented in section 5.3) and with 
costly management (problem (5.30) presented in section 5.5). 
In order to find the second-best timing of management regime switch(es), we 
therefore assume that the current value Hamiltonian (5.31) is optimized, and we denote 






( ) ( )( )
( )
SP hN s h
SP SP h SP t0
SP h
t
P y dy N s L
H* s e
g s N s h
H* s e .
τ −δ
−δ
⎡ ⎤−ω −ω∫⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥







where ( )H* s%  is the optimized current value Hamiltonian at stock s; x and y are 
placeholders. The social planner's costly management problem is autonomous, which is 
why its solution yields variables depending on s but not t in (IV.A.1). 
The planner’s problem is to maximize (IV.A.1) at all times. Interestingly, with 
the flow of fixed cost of management, SPLτω , we could find that ( )H* s 0<%  even 
though * 0µ > ; in such a case, open access would be the preferred course of action even 




this reason for the social planner to choose open access and that is why we restrict our 
attention to cases where Assumption 5.1 holds: * 0µ >  for all feasible s. 
Assuming that T0 = 0, the resource planner's timing problem is as follows: 
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i 1
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Max J T ,T H * t e dt
P y dy N s L
e dt , i 0,2,4,..., .
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Using Leibnitz' rule of differentiation of integrals, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
that peg Ti+1, the time(s) when open access is chosen over costly management, are 
 ( ) ( )i 1i 1 i 2 T i 1
i 1
J T ,T
e H * T 0,
T







 i 1T 0+ ≥  and 
( )











, i = 0, 2, 4,…, ∞. (IV.A.3) 
Similarly, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that peg Ti+2, the time(s) when costly 
management is chosen over open access, are 
 ( ) ( )i 2i 1 i 2 T i 2
i 2
J T ,T
e H * T 0,
T







 i 2T 0+ ≥  and 
( )











, i = 0, 2, 4,…, ∞. (IV.A.4) 
According to (IV.A.3) and (IV.A.4), at both switch times i 1T−+  and i 2T++ , 
( )H* s 0=% . Let us write the equality generally at time T, which could be i 1T−+  or i 2T++ : 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
SP hN T h
SP SP h SP SP h
0
H * s P x dx N T L g s T N T h 0τ= −ω −ω + µ − =∫
% %l




Hence, for a stock where the management regime changes, we must have 
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